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The purpose of this paper is to present estimations of indicators of direct and indirect 
interventions of China’s government in agriculture. In order to put these indicators in 
context, the paper reviews China’s experience with policy reforms since the 1950s and 
measures the extent of these reforms in the agriculture sector. Unfortunately, due to data 
constraints, we can only produce quantitative measures of price distortions since the early 
1980s— that is, for the past 25 years. Because of the nature of China’s agricultural 
experience over the last six decades, this review emphasizes the sectoral and 
macroeconomic policies and elements of the institutional framework that have influenced 
the incentive framework facing the sector’s product and factor markets. The changes over 
the past quarter of a century in trade, price and marketing policies as they affect 
incentives for producing and consuming different farm products are reflected in estimated 
rates of government assistance to producers and consumers.  
The main finding of our paper is that the nature of policy intervention in China 
has changed dramatically over the past 25 years, propelling the agricultural sector from 
one characterized by high distortions to one that is relatively liberal. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s (henceforth the early reform period) there were distortions in both external 
and domestic policies that isolated farmers and food consumers from international 
markets. Importantly during the early reform period, domestic marketing and pricing 
policies made prices that domestic producers and consumers faced almost independent of 
the effects of trade policy. Because of this, even in the case of an exportable commodity 
(e.g., rice), a commodity that appears to have been subject to little distortion at the border 
(meaning that that the international price of rice and the free market price of rice were 
nearly identical), domestic pricing and marketing policies did not allow producers to reap 
the profits from international-level prices and instead forced farmers to sell much of their   2
surplus to the state at an artificially low price. Hence, domestic policies levied a tax on 
farmers even though there was little distortion at the border. Similar dynamics 
characterized importable commodities (e.g., wheat and soybean) where despite fairly high 
rates of protection from trade policies, consumers were still being implicitly taxed and 
producers were receiving much less protection than they would have had their been a free 
domestic market for the importable. 
In contrast, since the late 1980s and early 1990s (the late reform period), the 
liberalization of domestic markets has resulted in a reduction in distortions from domestic 
policies. During the late reform period the market gradually replaced the state 
procurement system as the primary mechanism for allocating resources, and market-
generated prices have become the basis of farmer production and marketing decisions. At 
the same time, especially in the case of importable commodities, trade policy has also 
become more liberal, with distortions from border measures falling substantially. As a 
result, we find that by the end of the late reform period (that is, after 2000), China’s 
agriculture is much less distorted in two ways. First, the differences between international 
and domestic market prices have narrowed considerably for many commodities, due to 
trade policy liberalization. Second, the elimination of domestic policy distortions means 
that when trade liberalization allows for increased imports or exports of agricultural 
commodities, prices in China’s domestic market change and farmer incentives are 
directly affected by them.  
In addition, we also examine the effect of input-oriented policies and exchange 
rate policies. We find that input-related policies have generated few distortions in the 
case of China since 1980. However, exchange rate policy, like changes to pricing and 
marketing and trade policies, has played a more important role. In the early reform era 
exchange rates were highly distorted and served to place an implicit tax (or reduce the 
amount of protection) on the agricultural economy. By the late reform era, however, the 
system of exchange rates was reformed gradually, which reinforced the gradual shift 
towards a more liberal agricultural economy. 
Despite the finding that considerable liberalization has occurred due to policy 
reforms in both the domestic and external economy, in the mid-2000s — 25 years after 
the reforms began — there are still distortions to agriculture. In some cases, remaining   3
distortions are coming mainly from import tariffs which, while low by international 
standards, are still providing a degree of protection for a number of importables (e.g., 
sugar and dairy products). In the case of other importable commodities (e.g., maize), the 
use of export subsidies continue to keep a wedge between the domestic price in China 
and the international market. The latter are mostly disguised as domestic marketing, 
transport and storage subsidies, which are allowed under WTO rules for developing 
countries. 
  To show these results and to provide the reader with a fuller discussion of recent 
changes to the structure of China’s economy, the policy environment within which the 
changes have been occurring, and the analytical approach and findings of the analysis of 
price distortions, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
examine the changes in the performance of the economy and review the policy 
environment and reform agenda during periods of change. We examine the changes for 
two separate time periods: the Socialist era (1950 to 1979) and the Reform era (1980 to 
the present). The period is split like this not only because of the differences in 
performance and policy changes between the two eras, but also because, in the 
subsequent distortion analysis, we are only able to quantify the effect of China’s 
liberalizing domestic and external changes after 1980. In the third section, we discuss our 
quantitative approach and sources of data. The results of the distortion analysis are 




Growth and structural change in agriculture since 1949 
 
 
The post-World War II history of the Chinese economy clearly divides into the socialist 
era that lasted until December 1978, and the era that followed in which China transitioned 
towards a market economy. 
 
The socialist era, 1949 to 1978   4
 
Socialist policies dominated the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in China and had profound and 
complicated effects on agriculture. In this section, we briefly review the performance of 
the agricultural sector, laying out its successes and failures. Second, we recount the major 
policies—inside and outside of agriculture—that we believe are responsible for 
producing the outcomes that were realized during the Socialist period. 
 
Performance during the socialist period 
The record on the performance of agriculture in producing food and other raw materials 
for industry during the Socialist period is mixed, and in part depends on the standard 
against which the sector’s performance is being judged. On the one hand aggregate trends 
show that agriculture played an important role in increasing food availability, especially 
that of staple grains (Huang et al. 2007). Between 1952 and 1978, total sown area only 
changed marginally, increasing by 6.3 percent; grain sown area also changed little, 
declining by 2.7 percent. Grain yields, in contrast, increased by 91 percent from 1952 to 
1978, an annual growth of 2.8 percent. In aggregate, China’s grain production rose by 86 
percent, a rise of 2.5 percent per year. Indeed, the growth rate of grain production 
outpaced that of the population (1.9 percent), meaning that China’s agricultural sector 
increased per capita calorie availability during the Socialist period.  
While credit has to be given for the increases in the absolute and per capita levels 
of food and agricultural raw material availability during a time when many other nations 
in the world were suffering from falling food production, it is difficult to argue that 
agriculture’s performance was stellar enough as to be considered a transformative force 
of the Socialist-era economy. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, China’s 
consumers remained on strictly rationed diets. Coarse grains—maize, sweet potato, millet 
and sorghum—made up much of an average citizen’s staple food intake. Cooking oil, 
sugar, meat and vegetables were not available on a daily basis for the typical consumer. 
Most telling, despite the growth, the average level of consumption in urban areas in the 
1970s was still low, at only 2328 calories per capita, while for the average rural resident 
per capita calories was barely above the UN’s average minimum requirement of 2100. 
Moreover, food production systems were so fragile that at times it was subject to   5
catastrophic failure, as was experienced during the famine of 1959 to 1961, a famine that 
killed more than 30 million people (Ashton et al. 1984).  
In fact, food availability became such an issue that during the late 1960s and 
1970s that China began to turn to international markets to supplement domestic 
production. Between 1973 and 1980, China imported on average more than 6 million tons 
of grain, mostly wheat. In peak import years, grain accounted for a large percentage of 
the value of China’s imports. Obviously, at a time when China’s planners were trying to 
jump-start China’s industrialization with imported machinery and other technologies, the 
inability of the agricultural sector to produce enough food (not to mention foreign 
exchange earnings from exports) put a drag on the nation’s development.  
Beyond the performance of the food production sector of the rural economy 
(which is at best mixed), almost everything else about the record of structural change 
during the first three decades of agricultural development of the People’s Republic is 
negative (Huang et al. 2007). For example, the production structure of cropping showed 
almost no change at all. In 1952 grain accounted for 88 percent of sown area, and grain 
was still being sown on 83 percent of the nation’s sown area in 1970. Likewise, there was 
little change in the structure of the agricultural sector, according to a broader definition. 
The value of the cropping sector as a share of total agricultural output value was 83 
percent in 1952 and was still 75 percent in 1970. Perhaps of greatest importance, income 
per capita of rural farmers and other metrics of wealth also reflected the stagnation of the 
agricultural sector. Despite the rise in grain output, rural earnings per capita in the 1970s 
were almost the same as they were in the mid-1950s (Lardy 1983). Annual per capita 
levels of rural consumption of almost every food even by 1978—nearly 30 years after the 
start of the Socialist era—were low, amounting to only 1.1 kilograms of edible oil and 6.4 
kilogram of meat (Huang and Bouis 1996). The poverty rate was between 30 and 40 
percent. 
The stagnation of income, given (even modest) rising output, suggests that 
productivity growth was low. Although data sources do not facilitate rigorous analysis of 
total factor productivity, there appears to have been a complete absence of productivity 
gain or allocative efficiency increase. In fact, the work of Stone and Rozelle (1995) and 
Wen (1993) support just such a conclusion. Using aggregate data, both papers end up   6
concluding that total factor productivity growth between 1950 and 1978 was zero or close 
to zero.  
Finally, there also was almost no sign of shift in the employment structure in the 
economy. While other rapidly developing countries in East Asia were diversifying the 
sources of income of the rural population and expanding employment in the off-farm 
sector, little was happening in China’s rural sector (Lardy 1983). In 1957 about 84 
percent of the population was in the agricultural sector; by 1970, the share of the 
population in the agricultural sector had risen to 85 percent (CNBS 2000); and by 1980 it 
was still 83 percent. Of the more than 400 million people in China’s rural labor force in 
1980, only 4 percent had a full time off farm job (deBrauw et al. 2002). In fact, according 
to data on percent of population in agriculture and GDP (World Bank 1985), for its level 
of income there were more people living and working in the agricultural sector of China 
than of any other country. 
 
Socialist policies and institutions 
Blame for the poor performance of the agricultural sector almost certainly can be placed 
squarely on the shoulders of poor policy. Even while local leaders were experimenting 
with privatized land through an ambitious set of land-to-the-tiller policies in the early 
1950s, other factions of the Socialist leadership were already developing policies that 
were threatening the incentives embodied in private land ownership (Lardy 1983). The 
levels of investment believed to be required to promote industrialization were, in part, 
obtained through transfers from the agricultural sector. During the planning era, the 
prices of agricultural products were depressed to allow food to be sold at low, rationed 
prices to non-agricultural sector consumers. It is reported that the ‘scissors difference’—
the extent to which the agricultural sector was taxed by the prices of agricultural goods 
being set below their market values and the prices of industrial goods being set above 
their market prices—was large. The estimated taxation rate at this time was 26 percent in 
1957 and 27 percent in 1978, primarily from direct taxation of the prices of agricultural 
goods (Yao 1994).  
After the early 1950s farmers were organized into collectives and then communes, 
eliminating the household farm in China. The main negative effect of the communization   7
movement was one of absence of incentives. The basic problem was that individual 
families were not the residual claimants of production and decision making was left to a 
collective leadership (Putterman 1993). Farm workers were assigned points based on 
tasks which were difficult to monitor. While there is a debate over the extent to which the 
collectives were able to motivate farmers to exert effort and attempt to increase the 
efficiency of production on their farms (Dong and Dow 1993, Lin and Yang-, 2000, 
Chang and Wen 1995), most scholars believe that free riding and the inability to monitor 
agricultural labor undermined the incentives in agriculture.  
  Socialist era pricing and marketing policies also did little to either encourage the 
efficient production or allocation of goods and services. Prices were fixed by the state 
(Sicular 1988b). Between 1962 and 1978, the price of grain remained almost unchanged, 
being adjusted only three times, rising by a total of less than 20 percent. Input prices 
played mainly an accounting function, as shortages kept most producers from having 
access to the quantities that they demanded. Marketing institutions—monopolized by 
government parastatals—did not encourage the development of agriculture; there was 
little competition and marketing officials did not have an incentive to search out low-cost 
or high-quality producers. Through plans directed by the marketing system, production 
was carried out based on (mostly) planned acreage, target volume, quality and variety of 
production. Even the ratio between home consumption and marketed surplus was 
stipulated.  
The system also served to help—at least in the short run—the state’s effort at 
forced industrialization by keeping down the price of staples in order to allow the state to 
keep wages low. Except for the amount used for the farm-households’ home consumption 
for food, feed and seeds, all production of grains and edible oils and fiber crops was 
procured only by the state at quota prices for a specified (compulsory) amount (Sicular 
1988b). After the early 1960s, the state also procured, at a somewhat higher above-quota 
price to provide an incentive to increase production, any surplus output beyond the quota 
and consumption by farm families. The incentives, however, were targeted at collective 
leaders and not the farmers on whose effort labor depended. To suppress the demand for 
agricultural products that were in short supply (because they were priced low), marketing 
policy also exercised tight control over food marketing in urban areas. Almost all major   8
commodities were sold by government agencies to urban consumers and rural households 
in grain-deficit regions at low prices upon presentation of ration coupons.  
During this same period fertilizer, pesticides and other material inputs, where 
available, were also sold through marketing channels monopolized by the state (Stone 
1988). The Agricultural Inputs Corporation sold fertilizer on the basis of a carefully 
formulated plan stretching from the province to the village. Collective leaders needed 
fertilizer coupons to buy fertilizer and other inputs that were in short supply.  
  In an agricultural system dominated by either tens of millions of individual 
farmers or hundreds of thousands of brigades and teams there is a need for the state to 
play a major role in organizing investments, since individuals have little incentives to 
make a wide set of investments. In a number of areas, the Chinese government did make 
such investments between 1950 and 1978. National leaders arguably put their greatest 
effort into water conservation (Nickum 1998). In the early 1950s, China’s irrigation and 
flood control systems were a shambles. The irrigated area was less than 20 percent of the 
total cultivated area (Stone 1988). After more than 20 years of investment by both 
national and local government and with the aid of uncountable man-years of corvée labor, 
China’s irrigation area had reached more than 40 percent by 1978. By the mid-1970s, 
every major river system also was protected by an intricate network of dikes, dams and 
flood diversion projects.  
In addition, led by a fully publicly-funded research and development system, 
China’s agricultural scientists led the developing world in many areas and were 
responsible for generating many new breakthroughs. Breeders developed semi-dwarf, 
high-yielding rice varieties several years before the Green Revolution began in other 
parts of Asia (Stone 1988). Farmers were able to use hybrid maize and disease-resistant 
wheat varieties in the 1960s and 1970s, long before such technologies were available 
elsewhere in other parts of the developing world. In 1976 Yuan Longping created and 
commercialized the world’s first hybrid rice variety (Lin 1991, Huang and Rozelle 1996). 
An extension system with nearly 500,000 agents was in charge of introducing the 
technology to brigade technicians (Hu and Huang 2001). By the mid-1970s most of 
China’s cereals were improved varieties.   9
China’s approach to planning, and its placement of the rural economy in the 
unplanned sector, also had dramatic effects on the nature of employment and China’s 
structural stagnation (Lyons 1987). Because China’s agricultural sector was so large and 
underdeveloped, leaders decided to make a sharp distinction between those that lived in 
rural and those that live in urban areas. Agriculture became part of the collective sector. 
In return for shipments of fertilizer and small amounts of capital and other inputs, the 
agricultural sector was expected to supply food and non-food commodities to the urban-
industrial parts of the economy. All of the rest of the needs of the collective agricultural 
sector were supposed to be taken care of by the leadership of the collective with its own 
resources. Farmers were not allowed to freely move out of their collectives. The scope 
and magnitude of the gap in housing, educational, health, welfare and other services 
between rural and urban widened throughout the Socialist period. Without doubt these 
hukou policies and other restrictions preventing rural people from moving into 
manufacturing and service provision artificially limited structural changes during the 
Socialist era and suppressed rural incomes and productivity.  
Two key external policies also worked against agriculture in the Socialist era. 
First, agricultural trade in the pre-reform era was also subject to the plan (Huang and 
Chen 1999, Lardy 2001). In essence, it was used to supplement the plan of the domestic 
economy. Given the nation’s commitment to self-sufficiency in all areas of the economy, 
imports were to be used only for procuring those products—most of which were 
machinery and other productive investments—that could not be manufactured 
domestically and which would help facilitate meeting the plan. Almost all trade was 
made through eight state-owned trading firms. In the 1970s, the agricultural state trading 
firms monopolized nearly all food imports and exports. Hence, it was not in the nature of 
the institutional structure of the state trade apparatus to allow specialization in labor-
intensive export crops which could be offset by imports of land-intensive staple crops. 
Agricultural trade was primarily looked upon as a means to generate foreign exchange.  
 
Summary: socialist agriculture was a policy-driven disaster  
After nearly 30 years of development, China’s agriculture was a mess. It was not really 
playing any of its roles effectively. Although output was up, this was only due to   10
enormous investments of central and local government funds and mostly corvée labor 
financed predominantly by the sweat of farmers. Productivity and incomes were stagnant. 
There was no structural shift towards a more productive, higher efficiency sector. A large 
share of the population was locked into agriculture. The clearest finding from the analysis 
of the Socialist era is that this dismal performance was due mostly to more than two 
decades of the implementation of Socialist policies—both inside and outside the 
agricultural sector. Neither the organization of production, nor the pricing system and 
marketing institutions, provided adequate incentives. Some investments were effective, 
but far too few to offset the negative effects of poor incentives. Perhaps most inimical 
were the policies that trapped the rural population in a system that designated them as 
second-class citizens and did not give them their fair share of investment, services or 
opportunities. In short, the agricultural and non-agricultural policy environment 
undermined the role that agriculture could have contributed a healthier modern economy.  
 
Performance during the transition era, post-1978 
 
In this section, we first describe the performance of the agricultural sector and examine 
the role that it has begun to play since the onset of the Reform era in the late 1970s. 
Second, we examine in greater depth the policy initiatives—inside and outside of 
agriculture—that have helped launch and guide China’s agricultural transition. We 
examine the reform strategy by looking at its various components, their implementation 
and the objectives of and rationale for each reform component.  
The ups and downs that characterized the performance of agriculture in the pre-
reform period disappeared after 1978. Whatever metric of success that there was in 
agricultural production in China during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was surpassed during 
the reform era, and agriculture finally began to carry out its various roles in the 
development process. Compared to the early and mid-1970s when agricultural GDP rose 
by 2.7 percent annually, the annual growth rate almost doubled to 7.1 percent during the 
initial Reform period from 1978 to 1984, before decelerating to 4.0 percent in 1985-95 
and to 3.4 percent in 1996-2004 (Table 1, row 1). By world standards these are high rates 
of agricultural growth over such a sustained period.    11
At least in the early reform period, output growth—driven by increases in 
yields—was experienced in all subsectors of agriculture. Between 1978 and 1984, grain 
production in aggregate increased by 4.7 percent per year (Table 1, rows 2 to 4). 
Production rose for each of the major grains, namely rice, wheat and maize (rows 5 to 
16). The success of agriculture in playing its role of supplying inexpensive food can be 
illustrated by an examination of grain prices in China. During the Reform era, with the 
exception of price spikes in 1988 and 1995 the real prices of rice, wheat and maize have 
fallen between 33 percent (maize) and 45 percent (wheat) from the late 1970s to the early 
2000s.  
Far more fundamental than rises in output and yields of the grain sector (although 
this certainly is connected with and in part made possible by the success in grain 
production), China’s agricultural economy has steadily been remaking itself from a grain-
first sector to one producing higher-valued cash crops, horticultural goods and livestock 
and aquaculture products. Like the grain sector, outputs of cash crops in general, and 
especially cotton, edible oils and vegetables and fruit, also grew rapidly in the early 
reform period when compared to the 1970s (Table 1, rows 14 to 21). Unlike grain, the 
growth of the non-grain sector continued throughout the reform era (with the exception of 
land-intensive staples such as cotton). The rise in some sectors has been dramatic. For 
example, between 1990 and 2004 the increase in vegetable production has been so fast 
that China as a nation is adding every two years the equivalent of the production capacity 
of California (the world’s most productive vegetable region). The share of te total 
cultivated area that is dedicated to fruit orchards in China (over 5 percent) is more than 
double the share of the next closest major agricultural nation. China today can more 
closely be said to be following the saying “taking apples and onions as the key link” than 
being a grain-first agriculture as in the Socialist era.  
China also is moving rapidly away from a cropping agricultural mentality. The 
rise of the livestock and fishery sectors outpaces the cropping sector in general and most 
of the subcategories of cropping too (Table 1, rows 22 and 23). Livestock production rose 
9.1 percent in the early reform period and has continued to grow at between 4.5 to 8.8 
percent since 1985. The fisheries sub-sector is the fastest growing component of 
agriculture, rising more than 10 percent per year between 1985 and 2000. Today, more   12
than 70 percent of the world’s fresh water aquaculture is produced in China. Also, the 
rapid and continuous rise in livestock and fishery outputs has steadily eroded the 
predominance of cropping (Table 2). After remaining fairly static during the Socialist era, 
the share of agriculture contributed by cropping fell from 76 percent to 51 percent 
between 1980 and 2005. At the same time, the combined share of livestock and fisheries 
rose to 45 percent, more than doubling their 1980 share of 20 percent. It is projected that 
by 2008, cropping will account for less than 50 percent of agricultural output in China.  
 
Moving off the farm  
The reform era has brought even more fundamental transformative changes when looking 
at a picture of the rural economy based on a definition that is broader than agriculture. 
While the average annual growth of agriculture (as seen above) averaged about 5 percent 
throughout the entire reform period, the growth rates of the economy as a whole and of 
the industrial and service sectors were faster (Table 1, rows 1 to 4). In fact, since 1985 the 
growth of industry and service sector has been two to three times faster than agriculture. 
Because of the differences in the sectoral growth rates, agriculture’s share of GDP has 
fallen from 40 percent in 1970 to less than 13 percent in 2005 (CNBS). Given the current 
growth of agricultural GDP and overall GDP, the share of agriculture will fall below 10 
percent after 2010. The shifts in the economy can also be seen in employment.  
Agriculture employed 81 percent of labor in 1970. By 2005, however, as the industrial 
and service sectors grew in importance, the share of employment in agriculture fell to a 
reported 45 percent (CNBS). 
 
Agricultural trade liberalization 
While so much has been made of China’s accession to the WTO as a turning point in its 
relationship with the world, in fact China’s open door policy started much earlier (Huang 
and Chen 1999). In the process, China has turned itself from a hermit country into one of 
the world’s great trading nations, including in the area of agricultural trade. From 1980 to 
2000, the total value of China’s agricultural trade grew by about 6.0 percent on an annual 
basis. Since 2000, it has more than doubled, making China the fourth largest importer of 
agricultural commodities in the world (Gale 2006). However, China is more than an   13
importer: in almost every year the level of agricultural exports has exceeded that of 
imports since the reforms began (Huang and Chen 1999). 
Perhaps more remarkable is the shift in the composition of trade that China has 
experienced over the past 25 years. Figure 1 shows that net exports of land-intensive bulk 
commodities, such as grains, oilseeds and sugar, have fallen, while exports of higher-
valued, more labor-intensive products, such as horticultural and livestock and aquaculture 
products have risen. In other words, China has begun to export those commodities in 
which it has a comparative advantage and import those in which it does not have an 
advantage. Disaggregated, crop-specific trade trends also show the same sharp shifts 
(Anderson et al. 2004).  
 
The production and marketing environment  
After more than 25 years of reform one of the most striking differences in the nature of 
agriculture is the role of government and local leaders in the production and marketing 
process. In contrast with the time during the Socialist era when local (commune and 
brigade) officials and bureaucrats in government supply and marketing agencies were 
deeply involved with all aspects of pre- and post-harvest decisions, by 2005 the situation 
had changed dramatically. Indeed, one of the most notable features of China’s 
agricultural economy today (with several exceptions) is the limited extent of government 
involvement. Restrictions on land ownership aside, China today may have one of the least 
regulated domestic agricultural economies in the world. In a recent survey done by the 
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, with the exception of farmers that were renting 
village-owned orchards that had been planted in the 1980s and early 1990s, in 100 
percent of the responses the farmer said that he/she made the planting decision and was 
not compelled by local officials (Rozelle et al. 2006). In another survey of households in 
eight provinces, all farmers in the survey stated that they purchased all of their chemical 
fertilizer on their own and that local officials had no role in the transaction (Zhang et al. 
2005). Moreover, all purchases were made from private suppliers.  
On the procurement side, whereas it used to be that government parastatals were 
responsible for purchasing the output of China’s farms, today, a large majority of sales of 
grain, oilseeds and fiber crops and literally all sales of horticultural and livestock   14
products are to small, private traders (Wang et al. 2006). Indeed, even with the rise of 
supermarkets and processing firms that are catering to the retail needs of the urban 
population, a recent survey found that almost all purchases of fruit, vegetables, nuts and 
livestock products are by individual entrepreneurs who are trading on their own account. 
The existence of millions of small traders that are competing with virtually no regulation 
has meant that China’s markets have become integrated and efficient (Park et al. 2002, 
Huang et al. 2004, and Rozelle and Huang 2004, 2005).   
 
Productivity trends and rural incomes 
While it is possible that agricultural productivity trends tell a somewhat different story of 
how transition affects agricultural performance than is the case for output (as it did in the 
pre-reform period), this is not so. First, as seen in Table 1, output per unit of land (i.e., 
yields) all rose sharply. In addition, for the entire reform period, trends in agricultural 
labor productivity (ALP), measured as output per farm worker, parallel those of yield. 
Moreover, several series of total factor productivity (TFP) estimates have been produced 
for China’s agriculture (McMillan et al. 1989, Fan 1991, Lin 1992, Wen 1993, Huang and 
Rozelle 1996, Fan 1997, Jin et al. 2002). The studies uniformly demonstrate that in the 
first years after reform (1978 to 1984), comprehensive measures of productivity (either 
constructed TFP indices or their regression-based equivalents) rose by 5 to 10 percent per 
year.  
In part due to rising productivity, and perhaps even more due to the increasing 
efficiency associated with specialization, shifting to the production of more higher value 
crops and livestock commodities and the expansion of off-farm work, rural incomes 
during the reforms have steadily increased (Table 3). Between 1980 and 2000, average 
real rural per capita incomes have risen from 771 to 2347 yuan. This annual rise (6 
percent) is remarkable and is as high as the growth rates experienced in Japan and Korea 
during their take-off years. The amount of attention given to the rural income problem by 
the media might seem surprising, but the reason has to do with the faster rise in urban 
relative to rural incomes. The increasing inequality is not only between rural and urban 
but also within the rural economy, between those that began relatively rich and those that 
were poor at the outset of reform. The growth rate of rural per capita income for those in   15
the richest decile is higher than average, at more than 8 percent annually. In contrast, 
although incomes are rising (at 3 percent annually), the rates of increase for others are far 
lower than for the richest, meaning in relative terms the poorest of the rural poor are 
falling behind.  
 
Summary of agriculture’s performance during the transition era 
In summary, whereas the Socialist era saw little transformation, during the transition 
period China’s agricultural sector has changed dramatically. Although the sector grew, its 
fall in importance in the overall economy, in terms of both output value and employment, 
characterize modern growth. The structure of the sector itself also is changing, 
diversifying out of coarse grains into fine grains, out of staple grains into higher valued 
crops, and out of cropping into livestock and aquaculture. Trade patterns are also 
changing more in line with China’s comparative advantage. One of the largest shifts is in 
the nature of the production and marketing environments; they have almost become 
laissez-faire and now involve little government intervention. Although the most dramatic 
changes have taken place most rapidly among the richer households, change is also 
occurring among the poor.  
 
 
Institutions and policy bases of reform 
 
 
Unlike in the transitional economies in Europe, leaders in China did not move to 
dismantle the planned economy in favor of liberalized markets during the initial stages of 
reform (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). Policymakers only began to shift their focus to 
market liberalization in 1985 after decollectivization was complete. Even then, 
liberalization was start-stop (Sicular 1995). Lin, Cai and Li (1996) argue that leaders 
were mainly afraid of the disruption that would occur if the institutions through which 
leaders controlled the main goods in the food economy (such as grain, fertilizer, and meat 
products) were eliminated without the institutions in place that work to support more 
efficient market exchange. Throughout, leaders also were investing and changing the   16





Although early in the reforms China’s leaders had no concrete plan to liberalize markets, 
they did take steps to change the incentives faced by producers that were embodied in the 
prices that producers received for their marketed surplus. Hence, perhaps one of the least 
appreciated moves of the early reformers was their bold decision to administratively 
increase the prices received by farmers (Lardy 1983, Sicular 1988b). Between 1978 and 
1983, in a number of separate actions, above-quota prices (the payments farmers received 
for voluntary sales beyond the mandatory deliveries) were increased by 41 percent for 
grain and by around 50 percent for cash crops (Sicular 1988b). According to State 
Statistical Bureau data, the relative price of grain to fertilizer rose by more than 60 
percent during the first 3 years after reform. During the early reform years, the rise in the 
above-quota price (a state-set price) represented a higher output price at the margin for 
farmers (Sicular 1995).   
The important contribution of China’s pricing policy was in the timing and 
breadth of the policy change. The first major price rise occurred in 1979, almost at the 
time reformers were deciding to decollectivize. However, following the leadership’s 
decision to gradually implement the Household Responsibility System (HRS—discussed 
below), beginning first in the poorest areas of China, the price increases immediately 
affected all farmers, regardless of whether they had been decollectivized. By 1981, the 
time of the second major price increase, less than half of China’s farmers had been 
allowed to dismantle their communes (Lin 1992). Hence, as long as there was some, 
albeit weak, link between the output price and production, the plan-based price rise would 
have led to increases in China’s farm output. Empirical studies on China confirm that 
there was a strong impact of these price changes on output during the first years of 
transition (Lin 1992, Fan 1991, Huang and Rozelle 1996, Fan and Pardey 1997).  
 
Increased incentives    17
 
China’s rural economic reform, first initiated in 1979, was founded on the household 
responsibility system (HRS). The HRS reforms dismantled the communes and contracted 
agricultural land to households, mostly on the basis of family size and number of people 
in the household’s labor force. Most importantly, after the HRS reforms, income and 
control rights other than the right to sell land belonged to individual households. That is, 
farmers became the residual claimants to their efforts.   
There is little doubt that the changes in incentives resulting from property rights 
reforms triggered strong growth in both output and productivity. In the most definitive 
study on the subject, Lin (1992) estimates that China’s HRS accounted for 42 to 46 
percent of the total rise in output during the early reform period (1978 to 1984). Fan 
(1991) and Huang and Rozelle (1996) find that even after accounting for technological 
change, institutional change during the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed about 30 
percent of output growth. Empirical researchers also have documented impacts that go 
beyond output. For example, McMillan et al. (1989) document that the early reforms in 
China also raised total factor productivity, accounting for 90 percent of the rise (23 
percent) between 1978 and 1984. Jin et al. (2002) show that the reforms had a large effect 
on productivity, contributing greatly to a rise in TFP that exceeded 7 percent annually.  
 
Domestic market liberalization policies  
 
In addition to pricing changes and decollectivization, another major task of reformers is 
to create more efficient institutions of exchange. Markets—whether classic competitive 
ones or some workable substitute—increase efficiency by facilitating transactions among 
agents to allow specialization and trade and by providing information through a pricing 
mechanism to producers and consumers about the relative scarcity of resources. The 
major changes to agricultural commerce in the early 1980s almost exclusively centered 
on increasing the purchase prices of crops (Sicular 1988b, Watson 1994). In this way, the 
decision to raise prices should not be considered as a move to liberalize markets, since 
planners in the Ministry of Commerce made the changes administratively and the price   18
changes mostly were executed by the national network of grain procurement stations 
acting under direction of the State Grain Bureau.  
An examination of policies and the extent of marketing activity in the early 1980s 
illustrate the limited extent of changes in the marketing environment of China's food 
economy before 1985. It is true that reformers did allow farmers increased discretion to 
produce and market crops in 10 planning categories, such as vegetables, fruits, and coarse 
grains. Moreover, by 1984 the state only claimed control over 12 commodities, including 
rice, wheat, maize, soybean, peanuts, rapeseed, and several other cash crops (Sicular 
1988b). However, while this may seem to represent a significant move towards 
liberalization, the crops that remained almost entirely under the planning authority of the 
government still accounted for more than 95 percent of sown area in 1984. Hence, by 
state policy and practice, the output and marketing of almost all sown area was still 
directly influenced by China's planners. Reforms proceeded with equal caution when 
reducing restrictions on free market trade.  
After 1985, although the process proceeded in a stop-start manner, market 
liberalization began in earnest. Changes to the procurement system, further reductions in 
restrictions on trading of commodities, moves to commercialize the state grain trading 
system, and calls for the expansion of market construction in rural and urban areas led to 
a surge in market-oriented activity (Sicular 1995). For example, in 1980 there were only 
241,000 private and semi-private trading enterprises registered with the State Markets 
Bureau, but by 1990 there were more than 5.2 million (deBrauw et al. 2004).   
Despite its start-stop nature, the extension of the right to private trading, to 
include surplus output of all categories of agricultural products after contractual 
obligations to the state were fulfilled, began to undermine the foundations of the state 
marketing system (Rozelle et al. 2000). Other than for rice, wheat, maize and cotton, 
reformers eliminated all planned procurement of agricultural products, such that  
government commercial departments could only continue to buy and sell if they did so 
through the market. For grain, incentives were introduced through reductions in the 
volume of compulsory delivery quotas and increases in procurement prices. Even for 
grain, after the share of compulsory quota procurement reached 29 percent in 1984, it 
declined to 18 percent in 1985 and 13 percent in 1990. The share of negotiated   19
procurement at market price increased from 3 percent only in 1985 to 6 percent in 1985 
and 12 percent in 1990.  
 
Technology and water infrastructure development  
 
Agricultural research and plant breeding in China remain almost completely organized by 
the government. Reflecting the urban bias of food policy, most crop breeding programs 
have emphasized fine grains (rice and wheat). For national food self-sufficiency 
considerations, high yields have been a major target of China’s research program except 
in recent years when quality improvement was introduced into the nation’s development 
plan. Although there have been several private domestic and joint venture investments in 
agricultural research and development, policies still discriminate against them.  
Today, the record on reform of the agricultural technology system is mixed, and 
its impact on new technological developments and crop productivity is unclear. Empirical 
evidence demonstrates the declining effectiveness of China's agricultural research 
capabilities (Jin et al. 2002). Our previous work found that while competitive grant 
programs probably increased the effectiveness of China's agricultural research system, 
the reliance on commercialization revenue to subsidize research and make up for falling 
budgetary commitments weakened the system.
1 It is possible that imperfections in the 
seed industry partly contributed to the ineffectiveness of research reforms in crop 
breeding. Since the late 1990s there has once again been a sharp rise in spending on 
agricultural research and development. 
Investment by the state in water control—both irrigation and flood control—
swamps the amount invested into agricultural research. As noted above, in the 1950s to 
the 1970s most of the state’s effort was focused on building dams and canal networks, 
often with the input of corvée labor from farmers. After the 1970s, greater attention was 
focused on increasing the use of China’s massive groundwater resources (Wang et al. 
2005a). By 2005 China had more tubewells than any country in the world, except 
possibly India. Initially investments were made by local governments with aid from 
                                                 
1 These findings are based on a series of intensive interviews and survey data gathered by CCAP from 
a wide range of agricultural ministry personnel, research administrators, research staff, and others 
involved in China's agricultural research system.   20
county and provincial water bureaus. But by the 1990s the government was encouraging 
the huge shift in ownership that was in any case occurring, as pump sets and wells and 
other irrigation equipment went largely into the hands of private farming families (Wang 
et al. 1995b). At the same time, private water markets (where farmers pump water from 
their own well and sell it to other farmers in the village) were also encouraged. The main 
policy initiative after the mid-1990s in the surface water sector was management reform, 
with the goal of trying to make water use more efficient.  
 
Trade policy  
 
In addition to important changes during the 1980s and 1990s in foreign exchange policy 
(changes that saw the nation’s currency depreciate steeply and trading rights become 
more accessible to traders), there were a number of other fundamental reforms to China’s 
international trading system. Lower tariffs and rising imports and exports of agricultural 
products began to affect domestic terms of trade in the 1980s. In the initial reform years, 
most of the fall in protection came from a reduction in the commodities that were 
controlled by single desk state traders (Huang and Chen 1999). For many products, 
competition among non-state foreign trade corporations began to stimulate imports and 
exports (Martin 2002). Although many major agricultural commodities were not included 
in the moves to decentralize trade, the moves spurred the export of many agricultural 
goods. In addition, policy shifts in the 1980s and 1990s also changed the trading behavior 
of state traders. Leaders allowed the state traders to increase imports in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
Moves to relax rights of access to import and export markets were matched by 
actions to reduce the taxes that were being assessed at the border. After the elimination of 
restrictions on imports and exports of many of China’s agricultural commodities, a new 
effort began in the early 1990s to reduce the level of formal protection. From 1992 to 
1998, the simple average agricultural import tariff fell from 42 percent in 1992 to 24 
percent in 1998 and to 21 percent in 2001 (Rosen et al. 2004).  
Overall, protection in the agricultural sector has declined in the past 20 years. 
Much of the falling protection in agriculture has come from decentralizing authority for   21
imports and exports, from relaxing licensing procedures for some crops (e.g., moving oil 
and oil seed imports away from state trading firms), and from changes in the foreign 
exchange rate system. Other trade policies have reduced the scope of NTBs, relaxed the 
real tariff rates at the border, and changed quotas (Huang and Chen 1999). Despite this 
real and in some areas rapid set of reforms, the control of a set of commodities that 
leaders consider to be of national strategic importance, such as rice, wheat and maize, still 
remains with government officials to a large extent (Nyberg and Rozelle 1999). 
Given the changes made prior to the nation’s accession to the WTO, it is not 
surprising that, while it was a major event in China (and it will have an effect on many 
sectors), in its most basic terms it is really a continuation of previous policies. Hence, the 
commitments embodied in China’s WTO accession agreement in the agricultural 
sector—market access, domestic support and export subsidies—are essentially just 
codifying and binding what China had already done in the 1990s.  
 
Summary: China’s transition era agricultural policies  
 
The scope of China’s policy efforts during the transition era is impressive. Policy shifts 
were made in pricing, the organization of production, marketing, investments, technology 
and trade. Although the rate of investment has risen during the reform era, China is 
probably still under-investing in agriculture compared to other sectors and other 
countries. Taxes—both those that are explicit and those implicit in pricing and trade 
policies—also have fallen. Although China is not heavily assisting the agricultural 
economy in the way that characterizes its neighbors in East Asia, it appears to be heading 
in the direction noted by Timmer (1998) in which developing nations, after a certain 
point, begin to turn from extracting from agriculture to making net investments in the 
sector.   
In addition, outside of agriculture, many policies and other factors have affected 
the sector. Other rural policies, such as those that govern fiscal reform, township and 
village enterprise emergence, and privatization and rural governance, almost certainly 
have a large, albeit indirect, effect on agriculture. Urban employment policies, residency 
restrictions, exchange rate management and many other policy initiatives also affect   22
agriculture by affecting relative prices in the economy, access to jobs off the farm, and 
the overall attractiveness of staying on the farm.  
When taken together, these policies have been shown to have a dramatic effect on 
China’s agricultural sector. They have increased output of food, driven prices down, and 
improved supplies of non-grain food and raw materials for industry. The mix of 
policies—pricing, improved property rights, market liberalization, investment, trade—
also have made producers more efficient. They have freed up labor and resources that are 
behind the structural transformation in the agricultural economy specifically and in the 
rural economy more generally. One of the most convincing indicators of agriculture in 
China beginning to play effective roles in the nation’s development is that the importance 
of grain in shrinking inside the cropping sector; the importance of the cropping sector is 
shrinking inside the overall agricultural sector; and the importance of agriculture is 
shrinking in the general economy. Productivity is up, and rural incomes are up. Many of 
the increases in welfare, however, are being generated by individuals (and there have 
been more than 200 million of them) that have been able to escape from grain production 
and move into high-valued crops, or escape from cropping and move into livestock and 
fisheries production, or perhaps most importantly, leave agriculture (the rural economy) 
altogether and move into off-farm jobs (in the city).  
 
 
Quantifying the distortions to agricultural incentives since 1980 
 
 
The task of quantifying the policy-imposed distortions to incentives faced by farmers in 
China involves first explaining the methodology used, and in particular the way 
distortions in the market for foreign currency are dealt with, as well as the sources of 
data. Once this is done the results are discussed in detail. 
 
Methodology and data sources 
   23
The main focus of the present study’s methodology is on government-imposed distortions 
that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. 
Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with 
a sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct 
agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it 
also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative 
evaluation. Specifically, we compute Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRA) for farmers 
including an adjustment for direct interventions on tradable and non-tradable inputs. It 
also generates an NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for 
agricultural tradables via the calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see 
Anderson et al. 2008).  
This approach is not well suited to analysis during China’s pre-reform era, when 
prices played only an accounting function and key prices such as currency exchange rates 
were enormously distorted. During the reform era, however, the price comparison 
approach provides valuable indicators of distortions to incentives for production, 
consumption and trade, and of the income transfers associated with interventions. Such 
an approach is necessary because of not only infra-marginal low procurement prices but 
also the complexity and non-transparency of the trade barriers applying to agriculture, 
including tariffs, licenses, quotas, tariff-rate-quotas, and state trading. Exchange rate 
distortions present particular measurement problems and require detailed analysis if 
price-comparison-based measures are not to be misleading. 
 
NRAs and CTEs 
The NRA is constructed by first estimating an NRA on output. The NRA on output is 
used to compare the price of a commodity in the domestic economy (at the port) with the 
international price of the commodity at the border (that is, cif in the port for an 
importable good; fob in the port for an exportable), taking into account inherent 
differences in product quality where appropriate. Conceptually, with the NRA on output 
we are trying to measure the extent of the distortions due to tariffs, exchange rate 
distortions, and other non-tariff barriers—at the border. A positive NRA indicates that the 
sector is being protected, while a negative NRA points to forms of taxation.   24
  Because we have independent observations on the prices obtained by farmers in 
local markets, the next step is to estimate an NRA on output at the farm level taking into 
account both border distortions and domestic distortions affecting farmer returns. This 
NRA is calculated after allowing for quality adjustment, tax or subsidies, transport, 
storage and handling costs in moving from the farm to the wholesale level. Their 
difference arises from subsidy or transfer payments that cause the prices received by 
farmers to differ from what they would receive under competitive internal market 
conditions. As we will see, these internal subsidy/tax measures had enormous impacts on 
the returns to Chinese farmers, particularly in the early reform era. 
  An important difference of interpretation between the two measures described 
above arises in the period where domestic distortions came from the requirement to 
deliver a fixed quota of output at a (low) plan price, while allowing producers to sell 
above-quota output at a higher market price. Clearly, these delivery requirements reduced 
the incomes of farm households. However, the impact on output levels is less clear. 
Sicular (1988) makes the point that, in the short run, the output decision of a firm is 
determined by the marginal, rather than the average, return. Under these circumstances, 
the infra-marginal tax imposed by the plan delivery requirement might not have reduced 
the incentive to produce. More recent work on decoupled price incentives, however, 
suggests that average returns may have a greater impact on output in the longer-term than 
previously thought, when the incentives for firm entry and exit are taken into account (de 
Gorter, Just and Kropp 2008). However, the inability of Chinese farm households to sell 
their land probably reduced the extent to which households exited in response to their 
reduced incomes.  
  Our final NRA measures also capture distortions on the input side. To do this, we 
provide measures taking into account direct subsidies and differences between the 
international prices of inputs and the prices that farmers pay for these inputs. While these 
forms of protection (or taxation) are important in many countries, we find that they are 
generally relatively small and so the overall NRA is mostly determined by the NRA at the 
farm output level.  
  Finally, while most of the focus is on agricultural producers, we also consider the 
extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, we use a measure called the   25
Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE). This measure is created by comparing the price that 
consumers pay for their food commodity and the international price at the border. As with 
the NRA, differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from distortions in the 
domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the 
prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the wholesale level) to differ from domestic market 
prices. If a CTE is negative, it means that consumers are paying a price that is below the 
international market price and that consumers are being subsidized. (For the exact 
methodology used to calculate these measures, see Anderson et al. 2008.) 
 
The foreign exchange regime 
Prior to 1981 the official exchange rate was seriously over-valued in China. While this 
did not directly affect exports and imports because decisions on their levels were made by 
planners, it did create serious accounting difficulties since exports generally incurred a 
loss (Lardy 1992). If the official exchange rate is nevertheless used, it provides 
misleading indicators of the incentives created by the foreign exchange regime: since it 
makes all foreign goods look inexpensive in domestic currency terms, it over-estimates 
the extent of any protection provided to any good being considered.  
In 1981, an Internal Settlement Rate intended to be aligned with the average cost 
of earning foreign exchange was introduced, providing at least some basis for meaningful 
comparisons between domestic and international prices. The introduction of the Internal 
Settlement Rate, at 2.8 Yuan per dollar for trade transactions in 1981, represented a near-
50 percent devaluation relative to the official exchange rate. It was used only for non-
trade transactions. This internal rate remained at 2.8 until January 1985, when it was 
merged with the official exchange rate. 
During most of the reform period, the Chinese foreign exchange regime was 
relatively transparent in its effect. Between the late 1970s and 1994, it was one of those 
characterized by Kiguel and O’Connell (1995) as involving differential rates for different 
types of current account transactions. The overvalued official exchange rate was a key 
element of this system. Prior to 1979, enterprises had to surrender all of their foreign 
exchange earnings at that rate. However, a right for exporting enterprises to retain some 
of their foreign exchange earnings was introduced in 1979 (Lardy 1992, p. 707). Given   26
the pervasive shortage of foreign exchange in the economy, it is clear that the value 
placed on these retained earnings was, on average, considerably above the official 
exchange rate, even though the value of this reform was diminished by restrictions on the 
tradability of retained foreign exchange between enterprises, whose needs for foreign 
exchange inevitably varied considerably.  
Over time, restrictions on trade in retained foreign exchange were liberalized, and 
a legal secondary market exchange rate emerged that was higher (more depreciated) than 
the official exchange rate. There was always a shortage of foreign exchange at the official 
exchange rate, forcing importers to meet their needs for additional foreign exchange at 
the secondary market rate. Under these circumstances, the exchange rate system created a 
distortion analogous to a tariff and an export tax. The exchange rate received by exporters 
was lower than that paid, at the margin, by importers.  
To account for the effects of the exchange rate system, we construct an exporter 
exchange rate series using the retention ratio to calculate a weighted average of the 
official and the secondary market exchange rates. We use the secondary market exchange 
rate as an indicator of the price paid for foreign exchange, at the margin, by importers. 
Following the methodology outlined in Anderson et al. (2008), we calculate an estimated 
equilibrium exchange rate as the simple average of the importer and the exporter 
exchange rates. This arbitrarily assumes equal elasticities of demand and supply for 
foreign exchange, but this assumption does not affect the final results for any trade 
impacts since taxes on imports and taxes on exports have the same effect (the Lerner 
Symmetry Theorem).  
The share of export earnings eligible to be retained rose over time, and the extent 
to which these rights were tradable increased. Initially there were limited opportunities to 
trade these rights, and their shadow value varied from firm to firm depending upon their 
foreign exchange earnings and their need for foreign exchange. Policy makers quickly 
recognized that it was important to be able to able to transfer foreign exchange between 
firms. Lardy (1992) notes that foreign exchange trading rooms were first established in 
Guangzhou (1980) and in Shanghai (1981). However, the exchange rates in these markets 
tended to be heavily managed, with the government seeking to set the selling price at, for 
example, the Internal Settlement Rate (Lardy 1992).   27
Formal foreign exchange adjustment centers (FEACs) began to be established on 
a large scale after 1985. These allowed firms with excess foreign exchange earnings to 
sell to ventures that sold their output domestically and needed foreign exchange. Over the 
next few years, a large network of these centers was established, and these markets 
became more closely integrated over time. By 1988, Lardy (1992) concludes that the 
price in the Shanghai market was subject to supply and demand, subject to the conditions 
on use of foreign exchange, including licensing requirements and import duties on 
imported goods. In parallel, the pricing policies for imported goods were becoming more 
liberal, such that by 1990 about 90 percent of all imported goods were based on the 
import price plus costs such as transport and tariffs (Lardy 1992). 
During the transition period, the exchange rate regime had an extremely important 
influence on the returns obtainable from exported goods and the prices paid for imported 
goods. Even in the absence of explicit trade policies, overvalued official exchange rates 
tended to lower the returns to exported goods, and to increase the cost of imported goods, 
often by large amounts. The combination of an overvalued official exchange rate and a 
secondary market rate exchange rate at which importers could purchase foreign exchange 
legally allows us to assess the effects of the foreign exchange regime, and to be begin to 
assess the impacts of other trade policies.  
The analytics of a multi-tier exchange rate system are relatively clear and easily 
seen in a partial equilibrium setting. Appendix Figure A3 shows the determination of the 
exchange rate in a market characterized by an upward-sloping supply of foreign exchange 
(perhaps determined by the marginal cost of generating additional assets) and a 
downward sloping demand for foreign exchange (perhaps determined by the extent of 
substitutability of imports for domestic goods). If there is an official exchange rate, E0, at 
which exporters must surrender their foreign currency to the central bank, and a 
secondary market exchange rate, Em , at which importers can buy foreign exchange, then 
the two-tier exchange rate system functions as a uniform tax on all exports or 
(equivalently) a uniform tax on all imports. Appendix Figure A3 shows the effect of such 
a regime. Setting the official exchange rate at E0 reduces the returns to exporters relative 
to the equilibrium rate E. The resulting shortage of foreign exchange drives up its scarcity 
value and, in the presence of a secondary market, its market price for sale to importers, to   28
Em. Under these circumstances, the two-tier exchange rate reduces export earnings from 
QE to QS. 
Introducing a foreign exchange retention scheme of the type used in China during 
the transition raises the return to exports by allowing them to convert some of their 
foreign exchange earnings at the higher secondary-market rate. The result of this is to 
increase the supply of foreign exchange from QS to QS′. The increase in the supply of 
foreign exchange allows its price on the secondary market to fall to EM′. This reduces the 
cost of imported goods, and increases the demand for imports from QS to QS′. 
The tax on exporters was diminished by the fact that exporters were allowed to 
retain some of their foreign exchange earnings and sell them on the secondary market. 
These retention rates have been estimated roughly as 20 percent between 1981 and 1984, 
25 percent in 1985 and 1986, 44 pct between 1987 and 1990 and 80 percent between 
1991 and 1994 (World Bank 1994). The resulting blended average received by exporters 
is shown as E'x in the figure. The introduction of the foreign exchange retention scheme 
reduces the secondary market rate because of the increased incentive to supply foreign 
exchange.  
The difference between the importer exchange rate and the estimated equilibrium 
rate is used as a measure of the exchange rate distortion component of protection to 
import-competing products. Similarly, the difference between the exporter exchange rate 
and the equilibrium rate is used as a measure of the exchange rate distortion to exportable 
goods. Using these principles, we obtain the results in Appendix Table A1. We use 
several different series for secondary market exchange rates: the internal settlement rate 
in 1981-1984; an estimated secondary market exchange rate in 1985-6; and the FEAC 
rate from 1987 to 1994. The idea is to take into account the information on the average 
exchange rates applying in Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centres when they operated 
(1987-94).  
Raw data on the official exchange rate and several measures of the secondary 
market rate are presented in Appendix Table A1, together with the estimated foreign 
exchange retention rates and calculated measures of the exchange rates applying, at the 
margin, to exporters and importers during the period. The final column of the table shows 
the estimated “equilibrium” rate.     29
 
The data used  
In compiling our data we necessarily had to make choices on the coverage of the 
commodities included in the study. Overall we have included 11 commodities: rice, 
wheat, maize, soybean, cotton, pigmeat, milk, poultry, fruit (using apples as a 
representative product), vegetables (using tomatoes as a representative product) and sugar 
(both sugarbeet and sugarcane). Over the study period, these commodities account for 
between 75 percent (in the late 1980s) and 60 percent (during the early 2000s) of the total 
value of agricultural output in China (Appendix Figure A4). Because decisions on 
production and consumption to China’s domestic market prices were only gradually 
being allowed to respond to domestic prices, and because we do not have access to 
reliable data on secondary market exchange rates prior to 1981, we focus on data for the 
period beginning in 1981. 
The data used in our study come from a number of sources, depending on the time 
period of analysis and the commodity. Commodity balance data (production, utilization 
trade and others) are from CCAP’s CAPSiM database, which are mainly from the 
Ministry of Agriculture (production), NSBC (consumption and others) and Ministry of 
Commerce (trade). Domestic prices are from several different ministries. Specifically, 
farm-gate output prices come from the cost of production surveys conducted by National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Wholesale and retail prices of most 
products are from the Center for Price Monitoring, National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Agriculture (China Agricultural Development Report), 
and Department of Rural Survey under National Bureau of Statistics of China. When 
wholesale and retail prices for some commodities in some years are not available, price 
margins from farmgate to wholesale and to retail are estimated. Much of the data on 
margins, transportation costs and other transaction costs are from an extensive set of 
surveys by Huang and Rozelle during the 1990s and the early 2000s, surveys which also 
served to establish which commodity price series provided appropriate bases for price 
comparisons. Some of this was previously reported in Rozelle et al. (2000) and Huang et 
al. (2004), which provide information on substantial quality differences between 
imported and domestic commodities and resulting biases in price comparisons as a   30
measure of protection. For more recent years, survey teams from the Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy interviewed traders in 10 cities around China in 2006. The data and 
sources for all of the commodities are in the Appendix. 
The international price data (fob and cif) for all commodities except milk are unit 
values of exports or imports, with adjustments for quality where needed. These data are 
from the Ministry of Commerce and China’s Customs Administration. For the border 
price of milk, because no import prices for milk are available, we use the farm gate price 
of milk in New Zealand adjusted by international transportation and insurance rates to 
create a series for the international price of milk (cif) that we refer to as the “reference 
price.”  
Other data used in this study include tariff rates, tax and subsidies. Tariff rates are 
from the Office of Tariff Regulation (Import and Export Tariff Regulation and Import 
Tariff and Export Tariff Rebate Compilation). Agricultural tax data come from cost of 
production surveys conducted by National Development and Reform Commission. 
Subsidies (e.g., recent grain subsidies) are from various government documents. 
Aggregate input subsidies are from estimates of PSEs by the OECD (2005), which are 




One indicator of the success of China’s reform policies can be seen indirectly by 
examining free market prices on four of China’s most important crops (Appendix Figure 
A5). Despite the sharp rise in demand after 1980 for all commodities, as a result of 
increases in the population, rapid increases in income, the shift of the population from 
rural to urban and gradual marketization, prices were relatively stable over time and 
showed little trend. With an overall self sufficiency rate for rice, wheat, maize and 
soybean during the 1980s and 1990s of nearly 100 percent (Huang and Chen 1999), it is 
clear that China’s domestic production kept up with growth in demand. The rise in supply 
as well as total factor productivity is shown in many papers to come from a reduction in 
the distortions to production incentives that were driven by a combination of improved   31
property rights, access to new technologies and other factors (Lin 1992, Fan 1991, Huang 
and Rozelle 1996, Jin et al. 2002).  
 
The role of domestic price and marketing policy 
Before examining the role of distortions at the border, it is useful to examine the 
relationship between the available domestic price series for farm and retail prices for the 
major grain crops (Appendix Figure A6, Panels A, B and C). The importance (and role) 
of China’s domestic price and marketing policy for rice, wheat and maize (the three 
largest crops in China) can be seen by comparing the state-set urban retail price and the 
state-set rural farm-gate procurement price with the rural retail price, a free market price. 
As discussed above, until 1992 the urban retail price for rice was generally substantially 
below the price on the free market in rural areas, despite the costs associated with 
transferring rice to the urban area. This was a consequence of a procurement price system 
designed to provide urban residents with relatively inexpensive (i.e., subsidized) food. 
Only urban residents could buy rice at these low prices and only with ration coupons that 
were available in limited quantities. 
In addition, the marketing and procurement system may have been the source of 
additional distortions. The relatively low price of the selling price of grain at the farmgate 
by farmers shows that China’s food system in the 1980s was set up to transfer income 
from rural to urban. The amount that farmers received for the mandatory deliveries was 
far below the free market price. However, there is some question about the effects on 
incentives for production and consumption given the infra-marginal nature of many of 
these transfers (Sicular 1988a). This is because after the mid-1980s farmers were able to 
sell additional amounts at higher market prices once they had met their obligation to 
deliver a fixed quota quantity at the low purchasing price. If a farmer sold more grain 
than was required by his/her delivery quota, and the above quota price was determined by 
market forces, there may have been less of a distortion. Ultimately, however, even such 
policies are not fully decoupled from incentives, with seemingly infra-marginal transfers 
away from rural households, for instance, giving their members an incentive to move out 
of agriculture (Wang et al. 1999).  Therefore, the distortions created by domestic   32
marketing and procurement systems may have distorted incentives relative to 
international prices. 
From 1992, however, changes to China’s domestic marketing and procurement 
system appear to have eliminated this additional layer of regulation for producers of rice, 
wheat and maize (Appendix Figure A6). In the early 1990s the urban price began to rise 
above the farm gate price, and urban and rural retail prices also came much closer 
together. This reflects the phasing out of the implicit taxation of farmers through the grain 
procurement system. The gap between urban and rural retail prices eventually 
disappeared, and the gap between the rural retail price and the farm price declined, 
possibly suggesting an improvement in marketing efficiency (Park et al. 2002). With the 
disappearance of the distortions from the marketing and procurement system, the 
remaining distortions after the mid-1990s reflect only trade policies and not trade and 
domestic policies. 
 
Nominal rates of assistance for China’s main agricultural commodities 
In this section we focus on the distortions faced by farmers in China between 1980 and 
2005. To do so, we plot NRAs on output (at the wholesale and farm level) over time for 
each of the 11 commodities. Because input subsidies were generally small in most of our 
sample period, we do not discuss these measures in this section of the paper. As discussed 
above, each NRA is computed at adjusted exchange rates. The resulting NRAs are 
summarized in Table 4 as five-year averages, and annual prices and NRAs are provided 
in numerous tables and figures in the Appendix.  
Distortions to the grain economy before 1995.  The distortions to the rice 
economy of China in the 1980s and early 1990s are characterized by two important 
features. First, the NRA of rice, an exportable commodity, is negative in every year 
between 1981 and 1995. Ranging between around -60 and -10, the negative NRA values 
show that China was highly competitive in international rice markets during these years, 
since it was nonetheless able to export rice. Trade policy, however, kept exporters from 
shipping large quantities of rice onto world markets, and kept the free market price of rice 
in China’s port cities below the world price. Clearly this demonstrates China’s 
commitment to keeping domestic market prices low. Even if there had been no other   33
distortions in the rice economy, producers would have faced prices below world market 
prices. 
The second feature demonstrates how domestic marketing and procurement 
placed a greater tax on farmers and insulated the domestic price of rice from the world 
market price even if trade policy had been liberalized. Because of China’s marketing 
policy that lasted through the mid-1990s, the state’s artificially low procurement price 
kept the price received by farmers systematically below the free market price of rice. 
Because of this the tax on rice ranged between -66 in 1981 and -33 in 1991 (Appendix 
Table A2 and Appendix Figure A7). Rice producers were among the most heavily taxed 
farmers in China, given the crop’s large share of sown area and large negative rates of 
assistance. Importantly, our analysis shows how the state used trade and procurement 
policy to tax its rice farmers. 
Unlike rice, the measures of NRA show that trade policy offered some protection 
to wheat in China between 1981 and the mid-1990s (Table 4). During this period, the free 
market price of wheat in China’s port cities ranged between 27 and 64 percent, and 
averaged about 45 percent higher than the international price of wheat (cif, China’s port 
cities). This alone would suggest that China’s wheat producers—who have been shown to 
produce at a higher cost than producers in many other countries (Huang and Ma 2000)—
received significant protection from trade policy. However, domestic marketing policies 
were working in the opposite direction of trade policies. The NRA results in Appendix 
Table A8 show how the forced deliveries of wheat quotas reduced farmers the potential 
benefits from the high rates of protection. Although protection averaged around 15 
percent for wheat farmers in most years between 1981 and 1995, the rates were lower (all 
below 50 percent except in 1995) and were zero and even slightly negative in 5 of the 15 
years (1981, 1982, 1990, 1992 and 1993).  
The story of maize is a mix of those for rice and wheat (Table 4). In some years, 
trade policy provided positive protection for maize (1983 to 1987, 1989 and 1994), while 
in other years the domestic price of maize was lower than the world market price. On 
average, trade policy protected maize only marginally between 1981 and 1995. As with 
rice and wheat, procurement policy further depressed the price of maize in China’s 
farmers. In fact, except for 1985 and 1994, from the 1980s to the early 1990s the net   34
effect of international trade and domestic marketing policy was to tax China’s maize 
producers.  
Distortions to the grain economy after 1995. After 1995 our distortions analysis 
shows that China’s international trade and domestic marketing policies changed 
strikingly (Table 4). China’s domestic marketing policy finally was able to eliminate the 
procurement policies that had been taxing rice, wheat and maize farmers (either by 
reducing the tax imposed by the export policy as in the case of rice, or reducing the 
protection as in the case of wheat). In other work, Huang et al. (2006) show that the 
elimination of the procurement quota contributed significantly to a reduction in the tax 
burden shouldered by farmers.   
The liberalization of domestic markets in the mid-1990s was accompanied by a 
liberalization of trade policy, at least in the case of China’s major food grains (Appendix 
Figures A7 to A9). After 1995, the taxation and subsidization of rice and wheat clearly 
were being phased out as the NRAs for rice steadily rose (became less negative) and the 
NRAs for wheat fell. Likely in part in preparation for its accession to the WTO, China’s 
leaders liberalized trade for its main food grains to such an extent that between 1995 and 
2001 most of the protection for these crops was phased out. Since 2001, the NRAs for 
both rice and wheat have been almost zero.  
Interestingly, the case of maize is a bit different from the other crops (Apendix 
Figure A9). In a number of years after 2000, the NRA for maize has been positive. This 
indicates that at least in some years national leaders have been protecting maize 
producers. As discussed in Rozelle and Huang (2004), this may in part have been due to 
the rise of the Jilin lobby in the government that has been successful in gaining protection 
for the producers of its most important crop. 
Edible oils and cotton. The biggest difference between the analysis of distortions 
of grain crops and of cash crops (at least for soybean and cotton) is that domestic 
marketing policy historically has played less of a role. Although in some counties in 
China there was a procurement delivery quota for soybean producers, it was not as 
widespread as for grains (in many counties soybean was not procured by the state 
procurement system). In addition, the implicit tax on soybean in places where soybean 
quotas were collected was lower than that for the staple grain crops. Therefore, there is   35
little difference between the NRAs on output at the wholesale and farm level. The same is 
true for cotton, except in the case of cotton through the mid-1990s free market 
procurement of cotton by private traders was not allowed. When reform finally came to 
the cotton industry in the mid-1990s, leaders did not move to a two-tier pricing system, 
but instead allowed for both private trade and commercialized government cotton 
procurement stations. As a result, in the case of cotton the measures of distortion for 
NRAs on output at the wholesale and farm-level are nearly the same. The same is true for 
all of the rest of the commodities (livestock, horticulture, milk and sugar). As a result, the 
discussion in the rest of this section—for both the 1980s, the 1990s and the post-2000 
period—focuses on trade policy. 
Before 1995, our analysis shows that soybean also fluctuated between being taxed 
and protected (Table 4 and Appendix Figure A10). Although the average level of 
protection was close to zero, it ranged from  -20 percent to +40 percent. In a paper by 
Rozelle and Huang (2005) it is shown that a lot of this fluctuation was due to domestic 
production policy that encouraged soybean production, then discouraged it, then 
encouraged it while the trade regime allowed little trade.  
The trends in NRAs after the late 1990s show some movement to trade 
liberalization for soybean (Appendix Figure A10). Beginning in the late 1990s and 
continuing through to 2005 the protection rate for soybean fell from around 30 percent to 
less than half that. This falling protection should not be a surprise given the integration of 
China into world soybean markets and the monotonic rise in imports (which exceeded 25 
million tons in 2005). The story of soybean stands in sharp contrast to that of maize 
which enjoyed increasing protection. Because of the competition between maize and 
soybean for land and other resources, it appears that at the very time that protection for 
maize began to rise, soybean production was subject to sharp liberalization. 
The distortion analysis for cotton, in some sense, produces results similar to those 
for rice. The combination of trade and monopoly procurement policy kept domestic 
cotton prices lower than world market prices in the 1980s and early 1990s. It appears that 
China’s planners were taxing cotton farmers to supply its emerging textile industries with 
relatively inexpensive raw materials. Such high implicit taxes on cotton, and serious   36
insect problems, undoubtedly contributed to stagnant and even falling planted area in 
many regions (CNBS 2004).   
After 1995, however, with the liberalization of domestic markets (mostly) and 
increased trade liberalization (somewhat) there clearly been a shift in the level of 
distortions faced by cotton producers. Although there were fluctuations (protection was 
high in 2000 but cotton was implicitly taxed in 1999 and 2001), the average NRA since 
the mid-1990s, taking into account trade status in each year, has been close to zero. In 
recent years, despite the fact that national leaders could impose tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
on cotton after a certain amount is imported, trade officials essentially have left the level 
of imports in most years to be determined by the market.  
Livestock, sugar and horticultural commodities. With the exception of several 
years in the late 1980s and early 1990s for fruit, and pre-1985 for poultry, the patterns of 
distortions to China’s livestock and horticultural sectors are remarkably similar (Table 4). 
In all cases in the early reform era there was heavy implicit taxation on livestock and 
horticultural commodities. In part, as noted by Huang et al. (2004), this situation was 
created by China’s grain-first policy. Although China can competitively produce 
livestock and horticultural products, producers were not encouraged to produce or export 
these commodities on a large scale. Part of this was due to China’s own barriers, such as 
the quotas on exports into Hong Kong.      
Since the late 1990s the gaps between domestic and world prices of livestock and 
horticultural producers have fallen. Emerging markets and a relaxation of grain-first 
policies (often called structural adjustment policies) allowed producers to greatly expand 
livestock and horticultural production in large part to meet the rising demand inside 
China (Rosen et al. 2004). At the same time China’s accession to the WTO and the 
appearance of a large export-oriented segment of the livestock and horticultural industries 
has increased the interest in and feasibility of participating in international markets. In 
response, the price gap measures have risen towards zero for all commodities—pigmeat, 
poultry, vegetables and fruit. It should be noted, however, that the price comparisons 
reported in the Appendix as NRAs are all still negative. If anything, China’s presence in 
global food markets has given rise to more stringent rules and regulations on the import 
of livestock and horticultural commodities from China. Since measures are not China’s   37
own distorting policies, we have not included them in the overall NRA measures—rather, 
we have assumed them to be zero from 1994.   
The story for milk and sugar contrasts with that for livestock and horticultural 
commodities. During the 1980s, the NRAs for milk and sugar were positive and large 
(Table 4). Those for milk ranged from 40 to 160 percent between 1980 and 1987. They 
fell through the early 1990s, but rose again in the late 1990s before falling back 
somewhat in the current decade.  
The aggregate picture. Aggregating the 11 commodities in our study together and 
assuming that our study commodities largely reflect the distortions to all of China, there 
is a striking pattern (Table 4 and Figure 3). In the 1980s and through to the mid-1990s, 
import-competing products (such as wheat, soybean, milk and sugar) were very slightly 
taxed on average at the farm level, including the effect of any input subsidies. The rate of 
protection varied considerably and inversely with international price movements, 
suggesting the government sought to insulate the domestic market somewhat from world 
price fluctuations. Exported commodities such as rice, livestock and horticultural 
products were subject to substantial rates of taxation, averaging 37 percent in the period 
1981-1995 with large variations from year to year, including nominal rates of taxation of 
over 50 percent in a number of years. Since exported agricultural products accounted for 
a greater part of the economy than import-competing products during the early reform 
era, China’s agricultural distortions were negative on average. In other words, for most of 
the reform period China was taxing its farmers through its international trade and 
domestic marketing policies.  
  One of the main findings of this study is evident from Figure 3. After 1995, the 
NRAs of import-competing products fell from around 20 percent to less than 10 percent. 
During this period, the NRA average for exportables rose (or the implicit taxes on them 
fell), from about -40 percent to around -15 percent. When taken together, the distortions 
in China’s agriculture fell to less than 10 percent. In many years the overall protection 
was between 0 and -5 percent. Clearly, the combination of domestic marketing reforms 
and international trade liberalization has generated an agricultural economy that, on 
average, is neither being taxed nor assisted.   38
  This does not mean, however, that all distortions have been eliminated. For the 
period 2000-2005, there is still a wide dispersion in NRAs across commodities, with 
several still having relatively high rates of protection (Figure 4). For example, sugar and 
milk NRAs are still greater than 20 percent, and soybean and maize also are non-trivial at 
more than 10 percent, while the exportable categories of fruit, vegetables, pigmeat and 
poultry have close to zero NRAs. That dispersion is much less than it was in earlier 
decades though, as indicated in Tables 4 and 5 in the fall in the standard deviation of 
NRAs across the 11 commodities and also in the (anti-)trade bias index.   
  This elimination of distortions has not only affected farmers. A similar picture is 
evident when looking at consumer tariff equivalents (CTEs). In the 1980s and early 
1990s, consumers were being taxed by the positive protection on import-competing farm 
products, but were gaining from being able to consume exportables that were implicitly 
subsidized by marketing and trade-restricting policies. Some consumers of rice, wheat 
and maize were also receiving additional consumer subsidies. The net effect of these 
interventions is that until the past decade or so China’s consumers were enjoying a large 
implicit subsidy, in that the average CTE was negative in the 1980s  (around 40 percent) 
and early 1990s (around 15 percent). But then after the mid-1990s, as the distortions 
against producers declined and markets became the main mechanism for food flows, 
those households that are net buyers of food saw their implicit subsidy fall to close to 
zero on average. Even so, the CTE average for import-competing products is still well 
above that for exportables (just as for the NRA – compare Tables 4 and 6).  
             
Comparisons with other studies 
 
Three recent studies provide information on protection rates to agricultural products in 
China that can be compared with the estimates in this study. The first two are studies by 
OECD (2005, 2007) and the third is by IFPRI (Orden et al. 2007). These studies use a 
similar methodology, although they differ from ours in covering a much shorter time 
period, in the specific series used for price comparisons, and in the details of the 
methodology including the treatment of exchange rates. The OECD studies cover 1993 to   39
2005, while the IFPRI study provides estimates for most commodities from 1995 to 2001, 
(compared with our earlier coverage from 1981).   
Broadly comparable estimates
2 can be obtained from the three studies for six 
commodities—rice, wheat, maize, sugar, soybean and cotton—and for the period 1995 to 
2001. In addition, it is possible to compare the OECD and World Bank results for milk 
over this period. The estimated average protection rates for 1995-2001 are shown in 
Figure 5. As is evident from that figure, most of the estimates are similar, and the 
estimates for the extremely important rice and maize commodities are very close. The 
estimates for wheat are noticeably different, with our study suggesting this product was 
protected while the other studies suggest it was taxed. Our estimates for sugar, soybean 
and cotton are broadly comparable with the IFPRI study, but quite different from the 
OECD estimates. Finally, our estimate of protection to the dairy industry is much lower 
than the OECD’s estimate.  
Careful examination of the differences between our estimates and the OECD’s 
estimates for wheat reveals that this is entirely due to different assumptions about the 
quality differential between Chinese and imported wheat. While this study uses a quality 
adjustment coefficient of -40 percent for Chinese relative to imported wheat, based on 
Huang, Rozelle and Minh (2004), the OECD study uses an adjustment coefficient of -15 
percent. The much lower OECD estimate for protection to soybean over this period 
appears to result primarily from OECD’s use of a Heilongjiang price—a carefully 
considered decision based on the fact that producers in this region produce commercially 
and compete with imports—rather than a national price for soybean. We find our higher 
rate of protection in the 1993-2001 period more plausible given the rapid expansion in 
imports when protection subsequently fell. However, the two sets of estimates are 
reassuringly comparable in the 2003-2005 period.  
Our analysis for milk uses the New Zealand price for milk as the reference price 
plus a transport margin, while OECD uses measures based on international trade in milk 
products, converted to a milk equivalent basis. Our reference price is considerably higher 
over the period covered, resulting in the lower estimate of the rate of protection. The 
                                                 
2 We thank Andrzej Kwiecinski of OECD for very thoughtful comments that helped us to 
understand the differences between the two sets of estimates.    40
sizeable difference between the two estimates for sugar arises largely from differences in 
the assumed marketing and handling costs for sugar between farm and wholesale levels. 
Where we assumed that these costs were around 15 percent of the total, the OECD 
assumed costs around 60 percent of the farm gate price.  
These comparisons of estimates for particular products over this specific period 
highlight the differences, without emphasizing the important similarities in most of the 
estimated values, and particularly the similarities in their trends over time. However, they 
do highlight the importance of examining, and continuing to reexamine, the impact of 
particular assumptions in estimating nominal rates of assistance. 
 
Agricultural versus nonagricultural protection 
 
The rate of assistance to a particular sector is an incomplete measure of the implications 
of the trade regime for outcomes in that sector. What also matters is the protection to 
other tradable sectors competing for the same mobile resources such as labor and capital. 
In a very simple model, with only two traded-good sectors—agriculture and non-
agriculture—a broad idea of the total effect of the prevailing distortions can be obtained 
using only information on the magnitude of two NRA measures. The distortion to the 
price of agricultural goods relative to nonagricultural goods provides the signal needed to 
guide the transfer of resources between the two sets of activities. For any given level of 
world prices, this price signal is given by the ratio (1+NRAag
t)/(1+NRAnonag
t). This can be 
converted into a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) as follows:  
  RRA = 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) – 1]. 
The estimates of NRAnonag
t are provided in the Appendix to this paper. Briefly, 
these estimates take into account the effects of the trade planning mechanism, nontariff 
measures such as licensing and quotas, tariffs, and the exchange rate overvaluation prior 
to 1994. While extremely simple, we believe that those do provide a realistic indication 
of the broad pattern of incentives to the non-agricultural tradables sector for our sample 
period.  
The average rates of assistance to agriculture and to non-agriculture are presented 
in Table 5 and in Figure 6. The data show that the agricultural sector in China was subject   41
to two strong and reinforcing sets of taxation in the early years of our sample, one direct 
and the other indirect. The direct taxation through border measures and the procurement 
system resulted in a negative NRA of 45 percent in 1981–84. This negative NRA was 
only slightly lower, at 36 percent, in 1985-89. The indirect taxation of this sector, through 
support to non-agricultural activities, was similar in magnitude (42 and 28 percent) to the 
direct taxation in those two periods. 
The first major change in the incentive environment for the agricultural sector 
appears to have come in the mid-1980s, when the rate of protection to the non-
agricultural sector declined, with the sharp reduction in the taxation of the exportable 
manufacturing sector resulting from the widespread availability of duty exemptions on 
imported goods used in the production of exports. Protection to the nonagricultural sector 
appears to have risen slightly for several years in the late 1980s, with increases in tariff 
rates and in the exchange rate distortions outweighing reductions in the effects of trade 
planning and nontariff barriers. However, the protection to the non-agricultural sector 
began to decline steadily from 1990. The decline in the direct taxation of the agricultural 
sector began only later, with a sharp decline in the early 1990s arising—as previously 
discussed—in large part from reduction in the domestic taxation of the agricultural sector 
via the procurement pricing system.  
The declines in both the negative protection to agriculture and the positive 
protection to the non-agricultural tradables sector since the 1990s have changed 
dramatically the distortions to agricultural incentives: instead of facing a relative rate of 
assistance of close to -50 percent as in the 1980s, farmers are now receiving very slightly 
positive assistance with an average RRA of 1 percent in 2000-05. Clearly, this phasing 
out of farmer disincentives has been a major achievement for China’s policy of reform 
and opening up.  
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
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The main finding of this study is that the nature and extent of policy intervention in 
China’s agriculture has changed dramatically over the past 25 years, transforming the 
agricultural sector from one characterized by high distortions to one that is relatively 
liberal. In the early reform period of the 1980s and early 1990s there were distortions in 
both external and domestic policies that isolated domestic producers and consumers from 
international markets. Hence the prices that domestic farmers and consumers faced were 
almost independent of trade policy. Because of this, even for exportable commodities 
such as rice, whose free market price was close to the international price, domestic 
pricing and marketing policies forced farmers to sell much of their surplus to the state at 
an artificially lower price. Hence domestic policies levied a tax on farmers even though 
there was little trade taxation at the border. Similar dynamics characterized importable 
commodities such as wheat and soybean where, despite fairly high rates of protection 
from trade policies, producers were receiving much less protection than they would have 
had there been a free domestic market for the importable, even though consumers were 
being implicitly taxed. 
In contrast, since the late 1980s and early 1990s the liberalization of domestic 
markets has reduced the distortions from domestic policies, as the market gradually has 
replaced the state as the primary mechanism for allocating resources and has became the 
basis of farmer production and marketing decisions. At the same time, especially in the 
case of importable commodities, trade policy has become more liberalized, with 
distortions from border measures falling substantially. As a result, we find that in recent 
years China’s agriculture is much less distorted in two ways. First, the differences 
between international and domestic market prices have narrowed considerably for many 
commodities due to trade policy liberalization. Second, the elimination of domestic 
policy distortions mean that when trade liberalization allows for the increased import or 
export of agricultural commodities, prices in China’s domestic market change and 
farmers are more directly affected by them.  
Despite these major reforms, there are still plenty of distortions to agricultural 
incentives in China. In some cases these remaining distortions arise from tariffs on 
importable commodities (e.g., wheat and soybean). In the case of other importable 
commodities (e.g., maize), the use of implicit export subsidies (permitted under WTO   43
rules as domestic marketing, transport and storage subsidies) continues to keep a wedge 
between the domestic price in China and the international market. Thus some dispersion 
of NRAs among farm products remains, albeit much less than in the 1980s.   44
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Data source: Rosen et al., Forthcoming.
Notes:  Labor intensive commodities include fruits, vegetables, meat products and 
aquaculture products; land intensive commodities include food and feed grains, soybeans, 




Source; Rosen, Huang and Rozelle (2004)   52
Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
a 














































































































a The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing averages 
because assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   53
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Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural tradable industries, and relative 
rates of assistance




















































































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   56
 
Table 1: Annual real rates of growth
a of China’s economy, 1970 to 2004 
(percent p.a.) 
Reform period   Pre-reform
1970-78  1979-84  1985-95 1996-00 2001-04 
Gross domestic product  4.9  8.8  9.7  8.2  8.7 
   Agriculture  2.7  7.1  4.0  3.4  3.4 
   Industry  6.8  8.2  12.8  9.6  10.6 
   Service  Na  11.6  9.7  8.3  8.3 
         
Population  1.80  1.40  1.37 0.91 0.63 
         
Per capita GDP  3.1  7.4  8.3  7.2  8.1 
         
Grain production  2.8  4.7  1.7  0.03  -0.2 
Rice:           
Production 2.5  4.5  0.6  0.3  -0.9 
Area  0.7  -0.6  -0.6 -0.5 -1.2 
    Yield  1.8  5.1  1.2  0.8  0.2 
Wheat:         
Production 7.0  8.3  1.9  -0.4  -1.9 
Area 1.7  -0.0  0.1  -1.4  -5.1 
Yield  5.2  8.3  1.8 1.0 3.3 
Maize:         
Production 7.4  3.7  4.7  -0.1  5.5 
Area  3.1  -1.6  1.7 0.8 2.5 
Yield 4.2  5.4  2.9  -0.9  2.8 
Other  production         
Cotton -0.4  19.3  -0.3  -1.9  6.5 
Soybean  -2.3  5.2  2.8 2.6 2.4 
Other oil crops  2.1  14.9  4.4  5.6  0.6 
Fruit  6.6  7.2  12.7 8.6 29.5 
Meat  4.4  9.1  8.8 6.5 4.6 
Fishery 5.0  7.9  13.7  10.2  3.5 
         
Planted  area:         
Vegetables  2.4  5.4  6.8 6.8 3.8 
Fruits 8.1  4.5  10.4  1.5  2.2 
a GDP (in real term) in 1970-78 is the growth rate of national income in real term. 
Growth rates are computed using regression method. Growth rates of individual and 
groups of commodities are based on production data. 
 
Sources: NSBC, 1985-2005 and MOA, 1985-2005.    57
 




    1970  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  2005 
Share in agricultural 
output: 
         
    Crop  82  80   76   65   58   56   51  
    Livestock  14  18   22   26   30   30   35  
    Fishery  2  2   3   5   8   11   10  
    Forestry  2  4   5   4   3   4   4  
 
Source: NSBC, China’s Statistical Yearbook, various issues and China Rural 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
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Table 3: Rural income per capita in China, 1980 to 2000 
 
























Average  711  1248 1305 1702 2253 2347  6% 
 
Bottom decile (poorest)  312 448 442 493 579 578 3% 
 

















Source: Compiled using data from CNBS. 
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Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, China, 1981 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
       
Exportables 
a, b       
Rice  -55.7 -34.0 -30.4  -6.6  -7.2 
Fruit  -28.5 -9.4 -4.0  0.0  0.0 
Vegetable  -41.9 -57.5 -22.3  0.0  0.0 
Poultry 25.1  -27.1  -2.7  0.0  0.0 
Pigmeat  -78.6 -48.8 -14.9  0.0  0.0 
       
Import-competing products 
a, b       
Wheat  1.9 22.3 11.3 30.2  4.0 
Soybean  0.6 1.3 4.7  29.5  16.3 
Sugar  43.7 44.7 11.7 26.6 29.4 
Milk  128.7 58.3 -4.3 18.3 24.8 
       
Mixed Trade Status 
a       
Maize  -35.2 -16.1 -25.1  5.3  12.6 
Cotton  -33.7 -34.6 -26.2  -3.6  0.7 
       
All  covered  products         
    Exportables 
a, b  -58.1 -46.3 -22.0  -0.8  -0.2 
    Import-competing products 
a, b  -12.0  19.1 1.6  19.3 9.8 
    Total of all covered products 
a  -50.8 -40.6 -18.9  2.3  0.9 
Dispersion of covered products 
c  74.3 52.3 20.7 18.4 15.5 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  85  89  85  80  66 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or Import-competing products 
groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the 
weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   60
Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, 
China, 1981 to 2004 
(percent) 
   1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
Covered products 
a  -50.8 -40.6 -18.9  2.3  0.9 
Non-covered products 
b  -29.1 -15.4  -7.3  7.8  4.2 
All agricultural products 
a  -47.6 -37.9 -17.2  3.5  2.0 
Non-product specific (NPS) 
assistance    2.4 2.4 2.9 3.1 4.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) 
c -45.2 -35.5 -14.3  6.6  6.0 
Trade bias index 
d  -0.50   -0.55   -0.23   -0.15   -0.07  
       
Assistance to just tradables:       
   All agricultural tradables 
e  -45.2 -35.5 -14.3  6.6  6.0 
   All non-agricultural tradables  41.6 28.3 24.9  9.9  4.7 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
f  -60.6 -49.9 -31.1  -3.0  1.3 
       
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions
g :       
  NRA, all agric. products  -34.9 -27.1 -11.6  3.5  2.0 
  Trade bias index, all agric.  -32.7 -38.0 -12.6 -15.1  -7.4 
  RRA (relative rate of assistance)  -52.2 -41.0 -26.5  -3.0  1.3 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
b. Non-covered products import-competing products are assumed to be protected at 75 
percent of the rate applied on covered products. Non-covered products exportables are 
assumed to be protected or taxed at 80 percent of the rate applying to covered products.  
c. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) 
assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided to total 
value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
d. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and 
NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts 
of the agricultural sector. 
e. Assuming all agricultural production is tradable and including product and non-product 
specific subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively.  
g. These memo items show what the average NRAag, trade bias index and RRA would be 
if the distortions in the market for foreign currency, as captured by the methodology 
outlined in Anderson et al. (2008), are ignored. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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    1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
Exportables 
a, b       
Rice  -35.7 -28.8 -22.3  -4.2  0.1 
Fruit  -29.8 -11.8  -6.3  0.0  0.0 
Vegetable  -42.4 -57.9 -22.5  0.0  0.0 
Poultry  26.7 -26.1  -1.9  0.0  0.0 
Pigmeat  -75.1 -46.8 -14.9  0.0  0.0 
       
Import-competing products 
a, b       
Wheat  27.5 49.1 43.3 29.0  1.2 
Soybean  4.5 10.3 10.2 26.3 19.2 
Sugar  89.1 36.2 32.6 43.0 60.4 
Milk  127.2 57.5 -4.8 17.7 22.3 
       
Mixed Trade Status 
a       
Maize  -13.2 10.9  -13.4  8.4 14.9 
Cotton  -36.4 -37.5 -29.0  -8.6  -6.6 
       
All  covered  products         
    Exportables 
a, b  -52.0 -47.7 -19.2  -0.6  0.1 
    Import-competing products 
a, b  16.5 43.6 32.9 25.7  7.4 
Total of all covered products 
a  -44.5 -41.7 -15.8  1.7  0.7 
 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of consumption.  
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or Import-competing products 
groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet. 
 
   
Appendix: Protection to Non-Agricultural Sectors in China 
 
 
At the beginning of the reform era, non-agricultural protection in China was provided 
through four main mechanisms: trade planning; nontariff measures such as quotas, 
licenses, state trading and designated trading; tariffs; and exchange rate overvaluation. In 
this appendix, we focus on the first three measures, which provide protection (or 
taxation) that is specific to the non-agricultural sector. The effects of each of these forms 
of protection are examined in turn as a basis for attempting some assessment of their 
overall effects. Then, we attempt to provide estimates of the extent of protection provided 
to the non-agricultural sector. 
 
The trade planning system 
 
Decisions under the planning system focused on the quantities of goods needed to meet 
development objectives, such as promoting industrialization, and social needs such as 
food. For commodities subject to state monopoly trading, planners made decisions about 
the quantities of imports needed. Then, they decided on the quantities of goods needed to 
generate the foreign exchange required to obtain these imports. State trading firms were 
instructed to sell the quantities of exports required to generate the foreign exchange 
needed to purchase the quantities of imports included in the plan. The general view is that 
the planning system was quite restrictive of trade, with a strong preference for domestic 
production and self-sufficiency except in cases where goods simply could not be 
produced domestically. However, there seems little possibility of fully assessing their 
consequences in the absence of meaningful prices. Perhaps the best that can be done is to 
assess their impacts very broadly by examining their implications for overall openness of 
the economy. Even these measures must be treated with great caution because of the 
pervasive overvaluation of the exchange rate under planning, which increases the 
measured size of the nontraded sector relative to the traded goods sector.  
The move away from trade planning was an extremely important part of the 
reform process. A key element of this reform was the move from mandatory planning 
under which the planners determined quite specifically the mix of products to guidance 
planning, which involved much broader indicators of performance (World Bank 1994). 
While mandatory state planning covered 50-60 percent of exports and 40 percent of 
imports in 1986 (World Bank 1988, p 22), this share had fallen to about 20 percent of 
imports (and no exports) by 1992 (World Bank 1994).   
The move from planning was a complex task, since domestic prices were initially 
very seriously out of line with world prices. This created problems in the initial round of 
decentralization away from trade planning and contributed to a recentralization in 1981-
83 (Shan 1989). The share of goods sold at fixed prices was close to 100 percent in 1978, 
but fell to 10 percent for retail sales and 20 percent for capital and industrial goods by 
1992. To make exports profitable, the exchange rate also needed to be devalued, and this 
was undertaken during the reforms in the 1986-88 period. 
Appendix Figure A1 shows that the shares of imports and exports were extremely 
small relative to GDP in the early 1970s, and grew only marginally until 1978. After the 
initiation of reforms, however, exports and imports began to grow quite rapidly relative   2
to GDP, reflecting a combination of events, including; a reduction in the emphasis on 
self-sufficiency amongst planners, who sought to generate exports needed to pay for 
imports of technology, and a reduction in the importance of planning in the total trade 
regime. The special economic zones (SEZs) were important sources of additional exports 
from the early 1980s, and export processing regime began to be applied extensively 
outside the SEZs from the mid 1980s. 
 
Nontariff measures  
 
Nontariff measures became more important as China moved away from the pure 
monopoly trading regime. As more and more trading firms were introduced, control over 
the volumes of imports needed indirect instruments such as quotas and licenses. The 
number of these measures increased as the trade regime moved away from state trading 
(Lardy 1992, p. 44). 
It is clear that some of the nontariff barriers applying in the early post-reform 
period were quite restrictive. By 1997, the World Bank (1997, p. 15) estimated that the 
tariff equivalent of the remaining nontariff barriers was around 9.3 percent in 1996. At 
that point, the coverage of NTBs was an estimated 32.5 percent of imports, down from 39 
percent in 1988 (UNCTAD 1994). However, interviews in 1996 suggested that the 
restrictive effects of NTBs were considerably less than in the 1980s. As a very rough 
guesstimate, it seems reasonable to assume that the restrictive impact of NTBs was at 




Tariffs became increasingly important as a means of managing trade over the reform 
period. This move to price-based measures was associated with increasing liberalization 
of prices within China, which enabled price-based measures to help perform their 
function of guiding decisions on the supply and demand for products. Changes in average 
tariffs on manufactures in China are presented in Appendix Table A15. 
From Appendix Table A15, it appears that tariff rates on manufactures remained 
very high—or even increased in weighted average terms—between the early 1980s and 
1992. At that point, it appears that there was a substantial amount of “water” in many 
tariffs, with the domestic price being considerably below the world price plus the tariff 
for many products. After 1992, however, tariffs began to decline. After 1994, the decline 
became very rapid, with tariffs falling by more than half between 1994 and 1997. A great 
deal of the decline in applied tariffs in the late 1990s appears to have been part of the 
process of establishing China’s bona fides as a candidate for WTO accession. By 2001, 
applied tariff rates were around a third of their level in 1992. While still important, the 
reductions in tariffs required after accession at the end of 2001 were much smaller than 
those undertaken in the lead-up to accession. 
An important element of the tariff regime—and one which makes it difficult to 
evaluate its restrictiveness—was the exceptions provided for particular purposes. Duty 
exemptions on imports used in the production of exports were a particularly important 
element of this regime. Other duty exemptions were provided for investment goods. 
Many of these exemptions were initially given to Special Economic Zones (SEZs), but   3
the key exemptions for intermediate inputs used in the production of exports were made 
much more widely available from the mid 1990s. By 1990-1, only 18 (13) percent of 
processed (total) exports from China were from SEZs (World Bank 1994, pages 12 and 
135). In 1984, 14 coastal cities were opened up; in 1985, the Pearl River Delta and the 
Yangtze Delta were opened; in 1988, Hainan became an SEZ. By 1990, SEZs and open 
coastal cities accounted for 66 percent of exports.  
In addition to these formal exemption policies, there were substantial losses of 
tariff revenues due to avoidance and evasion of tariffs (Fisman and Wei 2004). This 
leakage of tariff revenues may have quite different implications from the formal 
exemption arrangements for intermediate inputs used in the production of exports. On 
one hand, it may allow additional imports to enter at low effective tariffs. On the other, it 
may merely result in some tariff revenue being transferred from the treasury into corrupt, 
private hands. Some of the leakage due to customs duty evasion shows up as a decline in 
the duty collection rate, and some as omission of both imports and customs duties.  
The duty exemptions and duty leakages have resulted in customs duty collection 
rates that are and order of magnitude lower than the statutory tariffs reported in Appendix 
Table A16, or in Ianchovichina and Martin (2004). This table presents estimates of these 
collection rates for the years they are available. These estimates show that tariff 
collections have been an order of magnitude below the statutory rates. Part of this can be 
explained by duty exemptions, which applied to 34.8 percent of total imports in 1988 and 
50.4 percent in 1991. 
One indicator of the extent of liberalization of the trade regime affecting 
manufactures, and tariffs in particular, is the importance of exports of manufactures. 
Exports of manufactures tend to be much more intensive in their use of imported 
intermediates than are exports of basic agricultural or resource-intensive products (World 
Bank 2004). Appendix Figure A2 shows the contributions of agriculture, manufactures 
and other exports to total exports.  
Perhaps the most striking feature of Appendix Figure A2 is the dramatic increase 
in the importance of manufactures exports after 1986, and particularly between 1986 and 
1992. While tariffs continued to be high in the 1986-1992 period, the rapid expansion of 
SEZ-type privileges, and especially the right to import intermediate inputs free of duties 
and NTBs, appears to have had a major liberalizing effect on manufactures trade. 
 
Estimated protection to the non-agricultural sector 
 
Bringing together the various estimates of protection to the nonagricultural sector allows 
us to provide a summary measure of protection to the nonagricultural sector. This is done 
by multiplying together the estimated protective effects of three different sources of 
protection to manufactures—tariffs (allowing for the reduction in protection due to the 
duty exemption arrangements after 1986); nontariff barriers; and an estimated trade 
restricting impact of the trade planning system. The three estimated elements of this 
system of protection are given in Appendix Table A17, together with the total of these 
measures. The final column of the table shows the measure including the protective effect 
of the exchange rate regime.  
  The protection to the non-agricultural sector as a whole is estimated by applying 
the total protection rate in Appendix Table A17 by the share of the manufacturing sector   4
in total non-agriculture—that is by excluding the mining sector from this calculation. 
This made a relatively small difference to the results, since the mining sector accounted 
for between six and 11 percent of the nonagricultural sector. For want of better 
information, and because of its small size, protection to the mining sector was assumed to 
be zero. We also assumed that the exportable sector of the manufacturing sector made up 
one half of the manufacturing sector, and that this sector received zero protection or 
taxation. This seems a reasonable presumption for most important exportable subsectors 
given the widespread availability of duty exemptions on intermediate goods used in the 
production of exports. Finally, the protective impact of the exchange rate regime on 
importable non-agriculture, and on exportable non-agriculture were added back to obtain 
a complete measure of protection. This calculation provided an estimate comparable with 
the average protection applying to the agricultural sector.  
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Appendix Figure A2: Shares of agriculture, manufactures and other merchandise in 




































Source: NSBC   7
 




















Source: see Anderson et al. (2008).   8
Appendix Figure A4: Agricultural production value shares by commodity, at undistorted 
























Source: Authors' calculations   9
 


























Source: Compiled from data in China Price Yearbook, 2005. Deflator: China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2006. 
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Appendix Figure A6: Rural Retail Price (free market price), Urban Retail Price and 
Farm-gate Sales Price in China, 1981 to 2005 
(Real 2005 Yuan) 
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Source: Compiled from data in China Price Yearbook, 2005.   11
 
Appendix Figure A7: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 


























Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   12
 
Appendix Figure A8: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 

























Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Appendix Figure A9: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 
Nominal Rates of Assistance for farmers (NRAf s) for maize in China, 1981-2005 
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   14
 
Appendix Figure A10: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 


























Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   15
Appendix Figure A11: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 
Nominal Rates of Assistance for farmers (NRAfs) for cotton in China, 1981-2005 
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   16
 
Appendix Figure A12: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 
Nominal Rates of Assistance for farmers (NRAfs) for pigmeat and poultry in China, 
1981-2005 
 









































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 
Note: These measures are calculated in the same way as NRAs and NRAfs reported for 
other commodities. However, the true NRAs for these commodities become zero after 
1994 because China has no policies holding their prices below world levels.   17
Appendix Figure A13: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 
Nominal Rates of Assistance for farmers (NRAfs) for vegetables and fruit in China, 1988-
2005 
 













































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 
Note: These measures are calculated in the same way as NRAs and NRAfs reported for 
other commodities. However, the true NRAs for these commodities become zero after 
1994 because China has no policies holding their prices below world levels. The reported 
price comparisons therefore provide a measure of the extent of taxation resulting from 
barriers faced in other countries.   18
Appendix Figure A14: Nominal Rates of Assistance at the wholesale level (NRAs) and 
Nominal Rates of Assistance for farmers (NRAfs) for milk and sugar in China, 1981-
2005 
 








































 Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   
Appendix Table A1: Exchange rates and related measures for China, 1980 to 2005 
(relative to the US dollar) 
 Official
a  Secondary











Importer exchange rate  Implied equilibrium 
exchange rate 
1980 1.498 1.948        1.498  1.498    1.498 
1981 1.705 2.045  2.8    0.2  2.800  2.800   2.800 
1982 1.893 2.271  2.8    0.2  2.800  2.800   2.800 
1983 1.976 2.392  2.8    0.2  2.800  2.800  Internal settlement  2.800 
1984 2.327 2.688  2.8    0.2  2.800  2.800   2.800 
1985 2.937 3.045  2.8    0.25 2.861  3.045 Secondary  rate  2.953 
1986 3.453 4.025      0.25 3.596  4.025    3.811 
1987 3.722 4.401    5.9 0.44 4.680  5.900   5.290 
1988 3.722 6.500    6.6 0.44 4.988  6.600   5.794 
1989 3.766 6.600    5.4 0.44 4.485  5.400   4.942 
1990 4.784 6.600    5.7 0.44 5.187  5.700  FEAC
e rates  5.444 
1991 5.323 6.603    5.9  0.8  5.785  5.900   5.842 
1992 5.515 6.925    7.3  0.8  6.943  7.300   7.122 
1993 5.762 8.282    8.7  0.8  8.112  8.700   8.406 
1994 8.619 8.700    8.7  0.8  8.684  8.700   8.692 
1995 8.351          8.351  8.351   8.351 
1996 8.314          8.314  8.314   8.314 
1997 8.290          8.290  8.290   8.290 
1998 8.279          8.279  8.279   8.279 
1999 8.280          8.280  8.280   8.280 
2000 8.280          8.280  8.280  Official 8.280 
2001 8.277          8.277  8.277   8.277 
2002 8.278          8.278  8.278   8.278 
2003 8.278          8.278  8.278   8.278 
2004 8.277          8.277  8.277   8.277 
2005 8.190               8.190 
Source: See notes below 
a NBSC; 
b Huang and David (1995); 
c The proportion of foreign currency actually sold by all exporters at the parallel market rate;  
d See Anderson et al. (2008) on the exchange rate methodology used in this study; 
eFEAC = foreign exchange adjustment center.  20
 
Appendix Table A2: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for rice (export), China, 1981 to 2005
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  377   1115   -0.66     667   1115   -0.40  
1982  381   1020   -0.63     650   1020   -0.36  
1983  382   878   -0.57     659   878   -0.25  
1984  461   751   -0.39     642   751   -0.15  
1985  507   663   -0.24     605   663   -0.09  
1986  562   756   -0.26     638   756   -0.16  
1987  635   1013   -0.37     737   1013   -0.27  
1988  788   1498   -0.47     906   1498   -0.40  
1989  935   1509   -0.38     1200   1509   -0.20  
1990  879   1388   -0.37     1150   1388   -0.17  
1991  856   1286   -0.33     1080   1286   -0.16  
1992  883   1633   -0.46     1200   1633   -0.27  
1993  1216   1800   -0.32     1293   1800   -0.28  
1994  2034   2152   -0.05     2005   2152   -0.07  
1995  2352   2403   -0.02     2258   2403   -0.06  
1996  2298   2507   -0.08     2459   2507   -0.02  
1997  2079   2329   -0.11     2101   2329   -0.10  
1998  1989   2150   -0.07     1993   2150   -0.07  
1999  1674   1913   -0.12     1907   1913   0.00  
2000  1540   1695   -0.09     1774   1695   0.05  
2001  1569   1695   -0.07     1658   1695   -0.02  
2002  1446   1729   -0.16     1628   1729   -0.06  
2003  1713   1738   -0.01     1822   1738   0.05  
2004  2264   2348   -0.04     2210   2348   -0.06  
2005  2316   2679   -0.14   2261   2679   -0.16  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
   21
 
Appendix Table A3: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for wheat (import), China, 1981 to 
2005   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  367   433   -0.15     548   433   0.27  
1982  373   416   -0.11     544   416   0.31  
1983  390   373   0.05     520   373   0.39  
1984  441   349   0.26     482   349   0.38  
1985  428   329   0.30     462   329   0.40  
1986  462   343   0.35     537   343   0.57  
1987  502   398   0.26     621   398   0.56  
1988  556   506   0.10     763   506   0.51  
1989  666   618   0.08     1011   618   0.63  
1990  644   674   -0.04     906   674   0.34  
1991  631   504   0.25     826   504   0.64  
1992  698   740   -0.06     1031   740   0.39  
1993  768   827   -0.07     1142   827   0.38  
1994  1190   817   0.46     1254   817   0.53  
1995  1592   1043   0.53     1530   1043   0.47  
1996  1701   1359   0.25     1750   1359   0.29  
1997  1470   1172   0.25     1502   1172   0.28  
1998  1385   1106   0.25     1356   1106   0.23  
1999  1254   1126   0.11     1277   1126   0.13  
2000  1102   988   0.12     1084   988   0.10  
2001  1074   1106   -0.03     1066   1106   -0.04  
2002  1010   1058   -0.05     1023   1058   -0.03  
2003  1127   1153   -0.02     1095   1153   -0.05  
2004  1478   1389   0.06     1442   1389   0.04  
2005  1442   1357   0.06   1410   1357   0.04  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A4: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for maize, China, 1981 to 2005 
(a) Export   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  241   417   -0.42     362   417   -0.13  
1982  238   351   -0.32     384   351   0.10  
1983  248   324   -0.23     387   324   0.19  
1984  318   338   -0.06     367   338   0.08  
1985  332   316   0.05     405   316   0.28  
1986  381   394   -0.03     480   394   0.22  
1987  385   437   -0.12     503   437   0.15  
1988  370   582   -0.36     541   582   -0.07  
1989  391   619   -0.37     746   619   0.20  
1990  455   645   -0.30     660   645   0.02  
1991  444   649   -0.32     567   649   -0.13  
1992  512   818   -0.37     601   818   -0.26  
1993  636   874   -0.27     700   874   -0.20  
1994  1016   939   0.08     967   939   0.03  
1995  1221   983   0.24     1242   983   0.26  
1996  1255   1379   -0.09     1430   1379   0.04  
1997  1172   1076   0.09     1111   1076   0.03  
1998  1120   939   0.19     1100   939   0.17  
1999  909   865   0.05     1005   865   0.16  
2000  893   832   0.07     859   832   0.03  
2001  990   864   0.15     1026   864   0.19  
2002  872   828   0.05     1001   828   0.21  
2003  1054   892   0.18     1055   892   0.18  
2004  1214   1160   0.05     1249   1160   0.08  
2005  1160   1010   0.15   1192   1010   0.18  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A4 (cont.): Prices and NRAs and NRAf for maize, China, 1981 to 2005 
(b) Import   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  241   527   -0.54     362   527   -0.31  
1982  238   421   -0.43     384   421   -0.09  
1983  248   410   -0.39     387   410   -0.06  
1984  318   454   -0.30     367   454   -0.19  
1985  332   415   -0.20     405   415   -0.02  
1986  381   426   -0.11     480   426   0.13  
1987  385   511   -0.25     503   511   -0.02  
1988  370   713   -0.48     541   713   -0.24  
1989  391   697   -0.44     746   697   0.07  
1990  455   752   -0.40     660   752   -0.12  
1991  444   786   -0.44     567   786   -0.28  
1992  512   953   -0.46     601   953   -0.37  
1993  636   1055   -0.40     700   1055   -0.34  
1994  1016   1208   -0.16     967   1208   -0.20  
1995  1221   1315   -0.07     1242   1315   -0.06  
1996  1255   1380   -0.09     1430   1380   0.04  
1997  1172   1208   -0.03     1111   1208   -0.08  
1998  1120   1052   0.06     1100   1052   0.05  
1999  909   976   -0.07     1005   976   0.03  
2000  893   919   -0.03     859   919   -0.07  
2001  990   944   0.05     1026   944   0.09  
2002  872   1010   -0.14     1001   1010   -0.01  
2003  1054   1175   -0.10     1055   1175   -0.10  
2004  1214   1175   0.03     1249   1175   0.06  
2005  1160   1024   0.13   1192   1024   0.16  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
   24
 
Appendix Table 4 (cont.): Prices and NRAs and NRAf for maize, China, 1981 to 2005 
(c) changing trade status   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  241   527   -0.54     362   527   -0.31  
1982  238   421   -0.43     384   421   -0.09  
1983  248   324   -0.23     387   324   0.19  
1984  318   338   -0.06     367   338   0.08  
1985  332   316   0.05     405   316   0.28  
1986  381   394   -0.03     480   394   0.22  
1987  385   437   -0.12     503   437   0.15  
1988  370   582   -0.36     541   582   -0.07  
1989  391   619   -0.37     746   619   0.20  
1990  455   752   -0.40     660   752   -0.12  
1991  444   649   -0.32     567   649   -0.13  
1992  512   818   -0.37     601   818   -0.26  
1993  636   874   -0.27     700   874   -0.20  
1994  1016   939   0.08     967   939   0.03  
1995  1221   1315   -0.07     1242   1315   -0.06  
1996  1255   1380   -0.09     1430   1380   0.04  
1997  1172   1076   0.09     1111   1076   0.03  
1998  1120   939   0.19     1100   939   0.17  
1999  909   865   0.05     1005   865   0.16  
2000  893   832   0.07     859   832   0.03  
2001  990   864   0.15     1026   864   0.19  
2002  872   828   0.05     1001   828   0.21  
2003  1054   892   0.18     1055   892   0.18  
2004  1214   1160   0.05     1249   1160   0.08  
2005  1160   1010   0.15   1192   1010   0.18  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A5: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for soybean, China, 1981 to 2005 
(a) import   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  804   964   -0.17     767   964   -0.20  
1982  791   860   -0.08     833   860   -0.03  
1983  791   760   0.04     853   760   0.12  
1984  796   773   0.03     871   773   0.13  
1985  804   652   0.23     851   652   0.30  
1986  939   874   0.07     978   874   0.12  
1987  1011   1222   -0.17     1102   1222   -0.10  
1988  1220   1582   -0.23     1296   1582   -0.18  
1989  1420   1555   -0.09     1785   1555   0.15  
1990  1415   1418   0.00     1591   1418   0.12  
1991  1543   1430   0.08     1493   1430   0.04  
1992  1699   1855   -0.08     1807   1855   -0.03  
1993  1902   2229   -0.15     2040   2229   -0.08  
1994  2369   2074   0.14     2559   2074   0.23  
1995  2843   2234   0.27     2714   2234   0.21  
1996  3296   2505   0.32     3144   2505   0.26  
1997  3339   2617   0.28     3192   2617   0.22  
1998  2671   2218   0.20     2698   2218   0.22  
1999  1935   1845   0.05     2131   1845   0.16  
2000  2022   1794   0.13     2200   1794   0.23  
2001  1990   1738   0.14     2074   1738   0.19  
2002  2028   1892   0.07     2100   1892   0.11  
2003  2609   2252   0.16     2500   2252   0.11  
2004  3079   2972   0.04     3210   2972   0.08  
2005  2793   2688   0.04   2920   2688   0.09  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A5 (cont.): Prices and NRAs and NRAf for cotton, China, 1981 to 2005 
(b) export   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  3155   3858   -0.18     3014   3858   -0.22  
1982  3203   3858   -0.17     3075   3858   -0.20  
1983  3224   3858   -0.16     3115   3858   -0.19  
1984  3447   3858   -0.11     3340   3858   -0.13  
1985  3242   4069   -0.20     3113   4069   -0.23  
1986  3471   5251   -0.34     3338   5251   -0.36  
1987  3921   7290   -0.46     3767   7290   -0.48  
1988  4449   7984   -0.44     4272   7984   -0.46  
1989  5782   6811   -0.15     5577   6811   -0.18  
1990  7197   7501   -0.04     6993   7501   -0.07  
1991  7290   8051   -0.09     7043   8051   -0.13  
1992  6539   9813   -0.33     6274   9813   -0.36  
1993  7811   11584   -0.33     7549   11584   -0.35  
1994  12355   11983   0.03     11975   11983   0.00  
1995  15489   18078   -0.14     15031   18078   -0.17  
1996  15235   23093   -0.34     14704   23093   -0.36  
1997  14896   19232   -0.23     14395   19232   -0.25  
1998  12554   10351   0.21     12119   10351   0.17  
1999  8161   9932   -0.18     7784   9932   -0.22  
2000  10967   9108   0.20     10566   9108   0.16  
2001  8094   12648   -0.36     7727   12648   -0.39  
2002  10153   8978   0.13     9764   8978   0.09  
2003  13642   9489   0.44     13200   9489   0.39  
2004  11514   12378   -0.07     11500   12378   -0.07  
2005  13795   11270   0.22   13778   11270   0.22  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A6: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for cotton, China, 1981 to 2005 
(a) import   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  3155   5159   -0.39     3014   5159   -0.42  
1982  3203   4465   -0.28     3075   4465   -0.31  
1983  3224   5184   -0.38     3115   5184   -0.40  
1984  3447   4991   -0.31     3340   4991   -0.33  
1985  3242   3887   -0.17     3113   3887   -0.20  
1986  3471   4018   -0.14     3338   4018   -0.17  
1987  3921   8708   -0.55     3767   8708   -0.57  
1988  4449   8097   -0.45     4272   8097   -0.47  
1989  5782   8263   -0.30     5577   8263   -0.33  
1990  7197   9888   -0.27     6993   9888   -0.29  
1991  7290   9784   -0.25     7043   9784   -0.28  
1992  6539   9088   -0.28     6274   9088   -0.31  
1993  7811   10747   -0.27     7549   10747   -0.30  
1994  12355   15300   -0.19     11975   15300   -0.22  
1995  15489   15549   0.00     15031   15549   -0.03  
1996  15235   15301   0.00     14704   15301   -0.04  
1997  14896   14710   0.01     14395   14710   -0.02  
1998  12554   13737   -0.09     12119   13737   -0.12  
1999  8161   11082   -0.26     7784   11082   -0.30  
2000  10967   12273   -0.11     10566   12273   -0.14  
2001  8094   10465   -0.23     7727   10465   -0.26  
2002  10153   10082   0.01     9764   10082   -0.03  
2003  13642   13840   -0.01     13200   13840   -0.05  
2004  11514   13507   -0.15     11500   13507   -0.15  
2005  13795   12299   0.12   13778   12299   0.12  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A6 (cont.): Prices and NRAs and NRAf for cotton, China, 1981 to 
2005   
(b) changing trade status  
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  3155   5159   -0.39     3014   5159   -0.42  
1982  3203   4465   -0.28     3075   4465   -0.31  
1983  3224   5184   -0.38     3115   5184   -0.40  
1984  3447   4991   -0.31     3340   4991   -0.33  
1985  3242   4069   -0.20     3113   4069   -0.23  
1986  3471   5251   -0.34     3338   5251   -0.36  
1987  3921   7290   -0.46     3767   7290   -0.48  
1988  4449   7984   -0.44     4272   7984   -0.46  
1989  5782   8263   -0.30     5577   8263   -0.33  
1990  7197   9888   -0.27     6993   9888   -0.29  
1991  7290   9784   -0.25     7043   9784   -0.28  
1992  6539   9088   -0.28     6274   9088   -0.31  
1993  7811   10747   -0.27     7549   10747   -0.30  
1994  12355   15300   -0.19     11975   15300   -0.22  
1995  15489   15549   0.00     15031   15549   -0.03  
1996  15235   15301   0.00     14704   15301   -0.04  
1997  14896   14710   0.01     14395   14710   -0.02  
1998  12554   13737   -0.09     12119   13737   -0.12  
1999  8161   9932   -0.18     7784   9932   -0.22  
2000  10967   9108   0.20     10566   9108   0.16  
2001  8094   10465   -0.23     7727   10465   -0.26  
2002  10153   10082   0.01     9764   10082   -0.03  
2003  13642   13840   -0.01     13200   13840   -0.05  
2004  11514   13507   -0.15     11500   13507   -0.15  
2005  13795   12299   0.12   13778   12299   0.12  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A7: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for pigmeat (export), China, 1981 to 
2005 
 
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  1894 7479 -0.75    1933 7479  -0.74 
1982  1895 10041 -0.81    2141 10041  -0.79 
1983  1897 9428 -0.80    2372 9428  -0.75 
1984  1910 9568 -0.80    2628 9568  -0.73 
1985  2542 4041 -0.37    2733 4041  -0.32 
1986  2705 6054 -0.55    3002 6054  -0.50 
1987  3219 8651 -0.63    3454 8651  -0.60 
1988  4685 10042 -0.53    4642 10042  -0.54 
1989  5277 8459 -0.38    5304 8459  -0.37 
1990  4985 9286 -0.46    5193 9286  -0.44 
1991  4857 8587 -0.43    5090 8587  -0.41 
1992  5186 10340 -0.50    5348 10340  -0.48 
1993  6040 9079 -0.33    6143 9079  -0.32 
1994  8430 10601 -0.20    8611 10601  -0.19 
1995  11122 12976  -0.14    10654 12976 -0.18 
1996 11057  13054  -0.15  9972  13054  -0.24 
1997  12827 15335  -0.16    11150 15335 -0.27 
1998  9948 14222 -0.30    9678 14222  -0.32 
1999  8470 10610 -0.20    7508 10610  -0.29 
2000  8689 10795 -0.20    8486 10795  -0.21 
2001  9010 10677 -0.16    9138 10677  -0.14 
2002  8653 10295 -0.16    8400 10295  -0.18 
2003  9636 10079 -0.04    9278 10079  -0.08 
2004  12514 12461  0.00    12189 12461 -0.02 
2005  11004 12642  -0.13    11440 12642 -0.10 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A8: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for poultry (export), China, 1981 to 
2005   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  4051   3328   0.22     4163   3328   0.25  
1982  4087   3116   0.31     4202   3116   0.35  
1983  4122   3201   0.29     4241   3201   0.32  
1984  4159   3748   0.11     4280   3748   0.14  
1985  5145   3954   0.30     5298   3954   0.34  
1986  2615   5668   -0.54     2679   5668   -0.53  
1987  3266   8829   -0.63     3338   8829   -0.62  
1988  5973   11073   -0.46     6132   11073   -0.45  
1989  8676   9376   -0.07     8922   9376   -0.05  
1990  8882   11402   -0.22     9134   11402   -0.20  
1991  8547   12714   -0.33     8795   12714   -0.31  
1992  8480   14083   -0.40     8734   14083   -0.38  
1993  8675   15747   -0.45     8933   15747   -0.43  
1994  8301   18295   -0.55     8545   18295   -0.53  
1995  12552   18560   -0.32     12923   18560   -0.30  
1996  12830   18011   -0.29     13200   18011   -0.27  
1997  11769   15690   -0.25     12114   15690   -0.23  
1998  11390   14422   -0.21     11731   14422   -0.19  
1999  10712   13834   -0.23     10954   13834   -0.21  
2000  9834   12057   -0.18     10126   12057   -0.16  
2001  10065   12391   -0.19     10353   12391   -0.16  
2002  10351   12839   -0.19     10648   12839   -0.17  
2003  10566   13245   -0.20     10872   13245   -0.18  
2004  11930   14484   -0.18     12281   14484   -0.15  
2005  12174   14788   -0.18   12532   14788   -0.15  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A9: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for vegetable (export), China, 1981 to 
2005   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  185   296   -0.37     184   296   -0.38  
1982  211   296   -0.29     210   296   -0.29  
1983  212   425   -0.50     209   425   -0.51  
1984  227   467   -0.51     224   467   -0.52  
1985  305   536   -0.43     301   536   -0.44  
1986  314   749   -0.58     310   749   -0.59  
1987  369   1120   -0.67     365   1120   -0.67  
1988  483   1313   -0.63     479   1313   -0.64  
1989  634   1437   -0.56     629   1437   -0.56  
1990  674   1409   -0.52     669   1409   -0.53  
1991  667   1463   -0.54     661   1463   -0.55  
1992  929   2031   -0.54     922   2031   -0.55  
1993  792   2095   -0.62     786   2095   -0.63  
1994  1119   2346   -0.52     1112   2346   -0.53  
1995  1424   1749   -0.19     1417   1749   -0.19  
1996  1330   1855   -0.28     1322   1855   -0.29  
1997  1099   1394   -0.21     1091   1394   -0.22  
1998  1086   1349   -0.19     1077   1349   -0.20  
1999  981   1108   -0.12     973   1108   -0.12  
2000  1048   1126   -0.07     1040   1126   -0.08  
2001  1063   1294   -0.18     1056   1294   -0.18  
2002  1008   1404   -0.28     995   1404   -0.29  
2003  1015   1325   -0.23     1005   1325   -0.24  
2004  1057   1338   -0.21     1055   1338   -0.21  
2005  1138   1389   -0.18   1136   1389   -0.18  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A10: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for fruit (export), China, 1981 to 
2005   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  439   696   -0.37     433   696   -0.38  
1982  472   696   -0.32     465   696   -0.33  
1983  516   786   -0.34     509   786   -0.35  
1984  697   792   -0.12     688   792   -0.13  
1985  794   843   -0.06     791   843   -0.06  
1986  1092   1096   0.00     1069   1096   -0.02  
1987  1152   1535   -0.25     1128   1535   -0.27  
1988  1583   1695   -0.07     1556   1695   -0.08  
1989  1347   1499   -0.10     1263   1499   -0.16  
1990  1438   1677   -0.14     1337   1677   -0.20  
1991  1925   1839   0.05     1802   1839   -0.02  
1992  1605   2693   -0.40     1527   2693   -0.43  
1993  1545   2589   -0.40     1450   2589   -0.44  
1994  2145   2350   -0.09     2014   2350   -0.14  
1995  2565   2604   -0.01     2465   2604   -0.05  
1996  1959   2683   -0.27     1816   2683   -0.32  
1997  1512   2387   -0.37     1428   2387   -0.40  
1998  1418   2197   -0.35     1323   2197   -0.40  
1999  1213   2008   -0.40     1143   2008   -0.43  
2000  1208   1880   -0.36     1138   1880   -0.39  
2001  1374   2567   -0.46     1297   2567   -0.49  
2002  1316   1973   -0.33     1259   1973   -0.36  
2003  1395   1996   -0.30     1348   1996   -0.32  
2004  1525   2054   -0.26     1515   2054   -0.26  
2005  1678   2131   -0.21   1666   2131   -0.22  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A11: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for milk (import), China, 1981 to 
2005   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  846   378   1.24     846   378   1.24  
1982  854   403   1.12     854   403   1.12  
1983  862   386   1.23     862   386   1.23  
1984  870   337   1.58     870   337   1.58  
1985  878   325   1.70     878   325   1.70  
1986  886   460   0.93     886   460   0.93  
1987  894   632   0.41     894   632   0.41  
1988  902   887   0.02     902   887   0.02  
1989  911   938   -0.03     911   938   -0.03  
1990  919   1030   -0.11     919   1030   -0.11  
1991  928   752   0.23     928   752   0.23  
1992  936   1172   -0.20     936   1172   -0.20  
1993  1146   1523   -0.25     1145   1523   -0.25  
1994  1539   1569   -0.02     1539   1569   -0.02  
1995  1530   1702   -0.10     1530   1702   -0.10  
1996  1872   2089   -0.10     1871   2089   -0.10  
1997  1981   1833   0.08     1980   1833   0.08  
1998  1935   1385   0.40     1934   1385   0.40  
1999  1934   1429   0.35     1933   1429   0.35  
2000  1860   1314   0.42     1860   1314   0.42  
2001  1575   1601   -0.02     1571   1601   -0.02  
2002  1938   1873   0.03     1936   1873   0.03  
2003  1927   1602   0.20     1926   1602   0.20  
2004  1943   1568   0.24     1943   1568   0.24  
2005  1944   1552   0.25   1944   1552   0.25  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A12: Prices and NRAs and NRAf for sugar (import), China, 1981 to 
2005   
At Farm Gate  At Wholesale 

















 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio  RMB/MT RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  594   469   28.69     622   469   0.48  
1982  597   462   31.53     626   462   0.51  
1983  637   481   34.75     667   481   0.55  
1984  797   464   74.99     835   464   1.01  
1985  822   464   80.44     862   464   1.07  
1986  844   652   31.83     884   652   0.51  
1987  1229   992   26.24     1288   992   0.45  
1988  1544   1154   36.48     1619   1154   0.57  
1989  1621   1142   44.81     1699   1142   0.66  
1990  1650   1635   3.09     1730   1635   0.18  
1991  1565   1249   27.98     1641   1249   0.47  
1992  1414   1403   3.05     1482   1403   0.18  
1993  1668   1757   -2.91     1748   1757   0.11  
1994  2370   1942   24.87     2484   1942   0.43  
1995  3017   2526   22.32     3163   2526   0.40  
1996  3057   2583   21.26     3204   2583   0.39  
1997  2995   2349   30.71     3138   2349   0.50  
1998  2597   2299   15.82     2722   2299   0.33  
1999  2058   1584   33.30     2155   1584   0.53  
2000  2178   1359   64.61     2282   1359   0.89  
2001  2241   2096   9.80     2347   2096   0.26  
2002  1986   1586   28.72     2080   1586   0.48  
2003  1865   1770   8.36     1954   1770   0.24  
2004  2170   1815   22.98     2275   1815   0.41  
2005  2837   2205   32.40   2974   2205   0.52  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A13:  Prices and NRA for processed sugar (import) in China, 
1981 to 2005 
  wholesale price 
processed 
border price per 
MT  NRAp=FP/BP-1 
 RMB/MT  RMB/MT  Ratio 
1981  885   469   0.89  
1982  877   462   0.90  
1983  884   481   0.84  
1984  900   464   0.94  
1985  907   464   0.96  
1986  899   652   0.38  
1987  1089   992   0.10  
1988  1254   1154   0.09  
1989  1480   1142   0.30  
1990  1561   1635   -0.04  
1991  2031   1249   0.63  
1992  1890   1403   0.35  
1993  2013   1757   0.15  
1994  3024   1942   0.56  
1995  3603   2526   0.43  
1996  3332   2583   0.29  
1997  3282   2349   0.40  
1998  3139   2299   0.37  
1999  2648   1584   0.67  
2000  2806   1359   1.07  
2001  2887   2096   0.38  
2002  2559   1586   0.61  
2003  2406   1770   0.36  
2004  2912   1815   0.60  
2005  3389   2205   0.54  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table A14: Annual distortion estimates, China, 1981 to 2005 








y  Rice 
Soybe
an  Sugar 
Veget




1981  -38 -37 -54 124 -74  24 -66 -12  30 -37 -15 -53 
1982  -28 -32 -43 114 -81  33 -62  -3  33 -29 -10 -53 
1983  -38 -34 -39 124 -80  31 -56  10  36 -50  5 -52 
1984  -31 -12  -5 152 -80  13 -38  9  76 -51  27 -45 
1985 -20 -5  6  160  -36 32  -23 30 82  -43 31  -24 
1986  -33  0  -3  88 -55 -53 -25  13  33 -58  36 -39 
1987  -46 -25 -11  38 -62 -62 -37 -13  27 -67  27 -50 
1988  -44  -7 -36  4 -53 -46 -47 -19  37 -63  10 -49 
1989  -30 -10 -36  2 -37  -7 -38  -4  45 -56  8 -40 
1990  -27 -8  -39 -6  -30 -5  -36  5  3  -45 -4  -34 
1991  -25  -6 -31  22 -22  -4 -33  14  29 -34  26 -24 
1992  -28  -4 -37 -18 -15  -3 -46  -4  3 -22  -5 -24 
1993  -32 -2  -27  -22 -7 -1  -32  -11 -3  -11 -7  -16 
1994  -19 0 9 2 0 0  -5  19  25 0  46 3 
1995  0 0  -7  -5 0 0  -2  33  23 0  53 3 
1996  2 0  -7  -3 0 0  -6  40  24 0  28 1 
1997  3 0  11  15 0 0  -9  35  33 0  28 3 
1998 -6 0  23  44 0 0  -5  28  18 0  29 4 
1999  -17 0 7  40 0 0  -11  11  35 0  13 0 
2000  22 0 9  45 0 0  -8  20  67 0  13 2 
2001  -21 0  16 4 0 0  -6  21  11 0  -1 0 
2002  2 0 7  11 0 0  -15  14  30 0  -3  -1 
2003  0 0  20  27 0 0 0  23  10 0  -1 2 
2004  -13 0 6  30 0 0  -2  10  25 0 8 1 
2005  14 0  17  32 0 0  -12  10  34 0 8 1 
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 Appendix Table A14 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, China, 1955 to 2005  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b 
and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
(percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 
















d na  na na  -40  na na  na  na  -54 
1981 0  -54 -35 -48  -58 -28  -48 na  -54 
1982 0  -53 -32 -47  -58 -19  -47  43  -63 
1983 0  -52 -31 -46  -59 -12  -46  42  -62 
1984 0  -45 -19 -39  -52 15  -39  40  -57 
1985 0  -25 -1  -17  -31  34  -17  39  -40 
1986 0  -39 -11 -33  -45 32  -33  24  -46 
1987 0  -50 -23 -45  -56 20  -45  25  -56 
1988 0  -50 -24 -46  -54  9  -46  26  -57 
1989 0  -41 -18 -36  -45  6  -36  27  -50 
1990 0  -34 -21 -29  -37 -16  -29  28  -45 
1991 0  -24 -6  -18  -28  13  -18  27  -36 
1992 0  -24 -12 -20  -26  -6  -20  26  -36 
1993 0  -16 -9  -12  -17 -5  -12  24  -29 
1994 0  3 11  7 0 25  7  19  -10 
1995 0  3 7 6  0  17  6  13  -6 
1996 1  0 4 4  -2  10  4  12  -7 
1997 1  2 11  7  -1 23  7 9  -2 
1998 1  3 11 10 1 21  10 9  1 
1999 1  0 6 5  -2  13  5  7  -1 
2000 1  1 9 8  0  17  8  6  2 
2001 1  0 1 4  0 1  4  6  -1 
2002 1  -2 1 4  -2 4  4  5  -1 
2003 1  2 4 7  2 6  7  4  2 
2004 0  1 4 7  0 8  7  3  3 
2005 0  0 6 7  -1  12  7  3  3 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
d. Estimates for China pre-1981 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of 
assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA estimates for for 
1981-89. 
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Appendix Table A14 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, China, 1981 to 2005 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 





1981  1 1 7 0 20 1 27 2 0  18 6 16
1982  1 1 5 0 26 1 25 2 0  16 6 16
1983  2 1 6 0 23 1 21 1 0  24 6 15
1984  2 1 5 0 26 1 19 1 0  25 6 12
1985  1 2 5 0 14 1 18 1 0  32 6 18
1986  1 2 5 0 18 2 16 2 1  37 5 11
1987  1 2 4 0 19 2 15 2 1  39 4 9
1988  1 2 4 0 19 3 18 2 1  38 4 8
1989  1 2 5 0 16 2 18 1 1  40 5 8
1990  1 2 6 0 14 3 17 1 1  34 6 14
1991  2 3 7 0 15 4 17 1 1  30 5 15
1992  1 3 7 1 14 3 19 2 1  32 7 13
1993  1 3 8 1 15 2 19 3 1  21 7 19
1994  2 4 7 1 18 4 19 2 1  24 6 13
1995  1 5 8 1 19 6 17 2 1  23 6 11
1996  1 3 9 1 18 5 17 1 1  21 7 15
1997  1 3 6 1 22 6 16 2 1  18 7 19
1998  1 3 6 0 18 6 15 1 1  18 6 25
1999  1 3 5 1 16 6 13 1 1  16 6 33
2000  1 3 4 1 16 6 11 1 1  19 5 34
2001  13  41 1 65911   1 85 3 5
2002  13  41 1 55911   1 84 3 7
2003  14  41 1 86911   1 94 3 3
2004  1 4 5 1 19 5 10 2 1  17 4 32
2005  1 4 4 1 17 5 11 1 1  17 4 34
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
a. At farmgate undistorted prices, US$ 
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Appendix Table A15: China’s tariffs on manufactures, 1980 to 2005 
 Manufactures 
 Simple  Weighted 
 %  % 
1980-83 50.5  36.6 
1984-87 41.9  33.2 
1992 44.9  46.5 
1993 41.8  44.0 
1994 37.6  40.6 
1996 23.1  23.2 
1997 17.5  17.8 
1998 17.4  18.5 
1999 16.8  13.4 
2000 16.6  13.3 
2001 16.2  13.0 
Post-Accession 9.5  6.9 
 
Source: Ianchovichina and Martin (2004); UNCTAD (1994).   40
Appendix Table A16: Import tariff collection rates, China, 1986 to 2002 















Source: World Bank (1994, p. 60) to 1991. World Bank Data for 1995-2002   41
Appendix Table A17: Elements of protection to the non-agricultural sector, China, 1981 
to 2005  
 
   Interpolated  Tariff      Total  Non Non   
 Tariff  Tariff  with  DE  NTBs  Planning  Importing   
Agric Agric- 
ER 
  % %  %  %  % %  %  
1981              
1982  36.6 36.6  36.6  22.0  15.0 91.6  42.9  
1983   35.8  35.8  21.0  15.0  88.9  41.6   
1984   34.9  34.9  20.0  15.0  86.2  40.3   
1985   34.1  34.1  19.0  15.0  94.8  39.1   
1986 33.2  33.2  22.1  18.0  5.0  68.4  24.0   
1987   35.4  23.6  17.0  5.0  86.9  25.0   
1988   37.6  25.1  16.0  5.0  94.7  25.8   
1989   39.9  26.6  15.0  5.0  81.1  27.4   
1990   42.1  28.0  14.2  5.0  67.9  28.3   
1991   44.3  29.5  13.4  5.0  57.3  27.3   
1992 46.5  46.5  31.0  12.6  5.0  62.6  26.3   
1993 44  44.0  29.3  11.7  5.0  62.4  23.8   
1994 40.6  40.6  27.1  10.9  0.0  41.2  18.9   
1995 25.3  25.3  16.9  10.1    28.7  13.3   
1996 23.2  23.2  15.5  9.3    26.2  11.7   
1997 17.8  17.8  11.9  8.3    21.1  9.3   
1998 18.5  18.5  12.3  6.9    20.1  8.8   
1999 13.4  13.4  8.9  5.7    15.2  6.7   
2000 13.3  13.3  8.9  4.8    14.1  6.2   
2001  13 13  8.7  4.0  13.0  5.8   
Post-Accession 6.9  6.9  4.6  3.0    7.7  4.9   
 
Note: The Total Importing estimate in this table is computed by multiplying the 
power of the entries under Tariff plus DE; NTB; and Planning. 
 